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Abstract
Organizational Structure and Process—An Analysis in Decision-Making
Dingyu Zhang, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2016
It is known that the performance of an organization is highly related to the process
through which activities are organized. However, the dyadic relationship between organi-
zational structure and process along with their influence on performance become compli-
cated when faced with complex activities. We explore this relationship and its influence by
following three lines of study.
First of all, in a setting of product development, we introduce a process model for
organizing concurrent activities. We show how to determine an optimal schedule. The
results demonstrate the variation of design performance, i.e., lead-time, rework, and total
workload, under a set of different overlapping strategies. Although depending on the setting
of case incidences, there generally exists no dominant strategy over all the performance
measures. As a result, managers should select the strategy based on preference over the
measures. Secondly, we address the question of how should an organization be structured
in a static as well as dynamic process variation. Organizational form will be changed along
two dimensions, i.e., departmentalization and assignment, whereas process evolves in terms
of complexity. In addition to improving the alignment of organizational structure with a
static process, we emphasize and study strategic guidelines of restructuring in the presence
of a dynamic environment. The last line of study is geared towards evaluating a group of
organizations which differ in preference. In the form of decision process, team specialty,
and communication structure, we show the comparative performance between two stylized
iii
decision processes, i.e., hierarchy and polyarchy, with or without communication between
agents in an environment where each project must be determined by two features. 1
1The second chapter of this thesis is published in IEEE, Transactions on Engineering Management. In
reference to IEEE copyrighted material which is used with permission in this thesis, the IEEE does not
endorse any of Concordia University’s products or services. Internal or personal use of this material is
permitted. If interested in reprinting/republishing IEEE copyrighted material for advertising or promotional
purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution, please go to http://www.ieee
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The behaviour of organizational process and structure has been an active area of study
for decades (e.g., March & Simon, 1993; Thompson, 1967). Organizational performance
is related to process arrangement whereby the flow of material and information is allocated
(Galbraith, 1977). In a similar vein, organizational structure, as a more holistic entity, exerts
great influence on the performance through the coordination of a combination of processes
under limited recourse. Because processes are usually inherently complex and interdepen-
dent on one another (Simon, 1996), improving organizational performance is not an easy
task since both the role of the organization and the process must be taken into account. In
relation to organizational performance, we follow three lines of study in this thesis, which
are (1) a process analysis in concurrent new product development (NPD) [chapter 2], (2)
an organizational structure analysis in a static as well dynamic process environment [chap-
ter 3], and (3) an organizational structure analysis in a decision making process [chapter
4]. While the spatial and temporal scales of these studies differ, the focal areas are also
different. The first line of study takes a relatively more atomistic view of an organiza-
tion by investigating the effect of various process strategies on performance, whereas the
second appreciates the important role of organizational structure in response to process
variation, and the third evaluates the performance through decision-making effectiveness.
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These studies are organized to stand on their own where each research problem is motivated
and accompanied by a focused literature review relevant to its topic. Although each study
provides guidelines of strategic decision-making from different aspects in organizational
structure and process, they complement one another in improving performance and jointly
contribute to form a more comprehensive understanding of organizational behavior. Hence,
we start with an overall literature review of the existing knowledge, followed by defining
the scope and the objectives of the thesis, and finally we describe the organization of the
thesis.
1.1 A Brief Review
1.1.1 Part One
In today’s highly uncertain and competitive market environment, organizational ac-
tivities like new product development (NPD) are crucial to the success of most industrial
companies (Datar, Jordan, Kekre, Rajiv, & Srinivasan, 1997; Swink, Talluri, & Pandejpong,
2006; Ulrich & Eppinger, 2015). In addition to product quality, improving NPD processes
through shortening the lead-time and reducing the cost has become the top priority of NPD
managers for the past few decades (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2015). Various strategies have
been investigated amongst which overlapping of NPD activities is in general a successful
strategy for reducing time-to-market (Hossain & Chua, 2014; Krishnan, 1993; Lin, Qian,
& Cui, 2012; Terwiesch & Loch, 1999; Yang, Lu, Yao, & Zhang, 2014a; Yang, Yao, Lu,
& Zhang, 2014b). However, prediction of the performance such as rework (iteration), lead
time, cost, and design quality under varying overlapping policies is not easy. Consequently,
strategic decision-making in terms of the timing of overlap, the communication intensity,
and other decision variables become difficult (Le, Wynn, & Clarkson, 2012).
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For the analysis of overlapping strategy, Krishnan, Eppinger, & Whitney (1997) char-
acterize NPD processes behaviour through capturing an evolutionary nature of process as
well as a sensitivity measure between processes. Their work provides an insightful way of
predicting rework which inspired a group of studies (e.g., Bhuiyan, Gerwin, & Thomson,
2004; Lin, Chai, Brombacher, & Wong, 2009; Lin et al., 2012; Lin, Qian, Cui, & Miao,
2010; Loch & Terwiesch, 1998). However, since the rework function does not easily re-
late to the downstream evolution behaviour under conditions of overlap (Lin et al., 2010),
analytical models are mostly limited to only two sequentially dependent tasks (Cho & Ep-
pinger, 2005); the exception is the simulation work in Bhuiyan et al. (2004) in which a full
process is covered. On the other hand, coupled processes are analyzed through modelling.
Smith & Eppinger (1997b) estimate the relative length of design cycle time by adopting a
design structure matrix architecture through the reward Markov chain method. Their study
serves as a basis for a group of others that focus on the effects of the sequence of coupled
tasks on NPD performance (e.g., Liu, Ding, & Liu, 2010; Othman, Bhuiyan, & Kong, 2011;
Smith & Eppinger, 1997a).
Although there has been much understanding and methods for prediction in relation to
how the complex relationship among processes exerts its influence on the performance of
overlapping, a rigorous reasoning and determination about the behaviour of up- and down-
stream dependence is unclear (Jun, Ahn, & Suh, 2005; Roemer & Ahmadi, 2004). Simpli-
fied assumptions have appeared to be the remedy. For example, while entailing inevitable
errors in estimating the dependence, downstream rework is modelled through probability
or an estimated degree of rework (e.g., Ahmad, Wynn, & Clarkson, 2013; Browning &
Eppinger, 2002; Cho & Eppinger, 2005; Smith & Eppinger, 1997b). Or the downstream
rework is considered as a function of upstream progress. Examples are Loch & Terwiesch
(1998), Roemer, Ahmadi, & Wang (2000), Lin et al. (2009), and Lin et al. (2010), while
what is missing is how the function is derived from practice (Jun et al., 2005). Clearly, a
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solid basis for the relationship between overlapping policy and its impact on process per-
formance is inadequately studied. Missing such a link would impede the decision-making
in choosing appropriate overlapping strategies. In this thesis, we build a framework with
addressing this gap where process dependence is derived from the dependent nature be-
tween design specifications. We shall argue that this nature is a key element in the analysis
of the effect of overlapping policies on process performance.
1.1.2 Part Two
An organizational process is not constant in that it may evolve continuously by respond-
ing to, for example, a potential market change, or a need for coordinating with another
changing process. Since one of an organization’s main function is to support everyday tasks
in a varying process environment, its ability to adapt fluidly through this changeable process
becomes more critical than ever before. It is clear that process performance is highly vari-
able with organizational structure (Csaszar, 2012; Hsieh & Chen, 2011; Kong, Bhuiyan, &
Thomson, 2008; Mihm, Loch, & Huchzermeier, 2003; Mihm, Loch, Wilkinson, & Huber-
man, 2010), but the difficulty is to value the extent to which an organizational structure fits
in a varying process environment. A better understanding of how organizational structure
evolves in order to respond to process variation becomes crucially important.
In the literature, the topic of organizational structure has long been one of the center
themes. Bavelas (1948) studies the mathematical property of a group communication pat-
tern and investigated its theoretical influence on group performance. His theoretical result
is later confirmed by Leavitt (1951) and Guetzkow & Simon (1955). In addition to this pure
structure effect, organizational structure as a whole has been argued from different perspec-
tives. For example, it is studied based on its function of reducing information uncertainty
and resolving information discrepancy (Galbraith, 1977), of generating ad hoc communi-
cation structures that support the implementation of everyday tasks (Mintzberg, 1979), and
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of shaping individual behaviour through the variation of communication structure and the
rules of reporting (March & Simon, 1993).
With a similar focus on organizational structure, a more fine-grained treatment can
be found in, for example, Marschak & Radner (1972), Gibson, Finnie, & Stuart (2015),
Christensen & Knudsen (2010), and Csaszar (2012) and later in Csaszar (2013). However,
the interactive as well as dynamic role of organizational process has largely been ignored.
In today’s highly uncertain and changing market environment, processes are continuously
modified and improved. Thus, how an organizational structure that is relatively inert re-
sponds so as to better coordinate the changing processes becomes increasingly important
to managers. We shall address this question with an organizational framework where a
group of organizational models and assignments are studied in process variation.
1.1.3 Part Three
Simon (1976) delineates his boundedly rational administrative person who not only has
insufficient information, but limited cognitive resource to make correct decisions. With
emphasis on its roles of providing relevant knowledge to agents as well as aggregating in-
dividual decisions, organization has long been studied through the perspective of decision-
making effectiveness. Individuals of different specialty are given information according to
the position within the organization, their decisions are organized through certain decision
structures where fallible individual decisions due to bounded rationality can be aggregated
and, to some extent, rectified, see studies in Sah & Stiglitz (1985), Csaszar (2012) and
Csaszar (2013).
Sah & Stiglitz (1986) start to investigate the influence of two stylized decision struc-
tures, i.e., hierarchy and polyarchy, in dichotomous choice situations where agents are
asked to screen projects which are either accepted or rejected. This line of study is ex-
tended to the analysis of committees (e.g., Ben-Yashar & Nitzan, 1997; Ioannides, 2012;
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Koh, 1994; Sah & Stiglitz, 1988), as well as to a set of more general decision structures
(Christensen & Knudsen, 2010; Csaszar, 2013; Ioannides, 2012). On the other hand, deci-
sion effectiveness is also dependent on the knowledge of the agent. Few studies address the
role of specialty in decision structure. For example, Prat (2002) links team homogeneity
with error reduction. He shows that the relative merit of workforce homogeneity or inho-
mogeneity is contingent on the environment through the correlation among errors faced by
agents.
Although the behaviour of the stylized decision structures have been well studied, only
few studies consider the environment with more than one dimension. Practical decisions
less frequently involve only a single factor under judgement. For example, a launch of a
new product should collect both opinions from the marketing department for its marketabil-
ity and from the production department for its productivity. Even fewer analytical studies
are to take both roles of organizational structure into account; exceptions are Visser (2000)
and Csaszar & Eggers (2013). On the other hand, decision-making not only depends on
the agent’s knowledge, but can be effectively affected by previous judgements to a similar
situation. For example, an agent can be made aware of her predecessor’s decision on the
project. Then how this awareness would change the performance of the entire decision
structure is an important question to managers who can subsequently be advised on how to
design the organization. To the best of our knowledge, only a few studies emphasize the
effect of historical decisions on the current decision-maker, such as herd-like behaviour in
Swank & Visser (2008). In short, given the fact that knowledge, including previous judge-
ment, is the basis of decision making, it would be natural to further the question of how the
decision structures perform with different group compositions of specialty in a complicated
environment. We shall address this important question in a project screening environment
where managers are to construct the organization in the form of three structures, i.e., deci-
sion, information as well as communication.
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1.2 Scope and Objectives
In response to the existing research gaps, our first line of study explores the behaviour
of two sequentially dependent processes in the setting of NPD. We build on the previous
results, as that in Krishnan et al. (1997), with a more fine-grained treatment on the product
design specifications and the communication between the processes so as to understand
how design dependencies affect downstream performance in overlapping. This study aims
to provide managers of NPD with strategic guidelines in determining the timing of over-
lapping, namely, when overlapping should begin, as well as the selection of appropriate
strategies accompanying the overlapping. These guidelines will be based on our model
through the prediction of the effect of varying strategic variables on NPD lead-time, design
quality, rework, and total work load (this line of study presented in Chapter 2)
The second line of study focuses on the interactive relationship between organizational
structure and process. Static environment, on one hand, will be studied to show how orga-
nizational structure fits its process. We consider departmentalization and assignment as two
key variables of the structure. The results will be tested with data from the NPD industry.
On the other hand, equal emphasis will be placed on a dynamic environment. Specifically,
one key question of the thesis is to find how organizational structure responds to process
change which evolves along two particular dimensions, exploration and exploitation. We
aim at summarizing a set of strategic guidelines for managers who face process improve-
ments that are either incremental (exploitative), or radical (explorative) as their problem
solving approaches over a short as well as a long period of time. These guidelines will
be focused on the structural side where managers are able to adjust in terms of depart-
mentalization and assignment. Also an alternative approach is taken into consideration in
which managers keep the organizational structure unchanged by opportunity loss (this line
of study presented in Chapter 3).
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Finally, in the setting of project screening, we question the important role of organi-
zational structures in the form of three parts: (1) decision process, (2) team specialty, and
(3) communication structure. Especially with two stylized structures, which are hierarchy
and polyarchy, we compare the relative performance with one another when the team spe-
cialty is an external variables. Conversely, determining the right team composition when
the decision process is given is investigated. In addition to the omission and commission
errors which have long been emphasized in the literature, this line of study explores how
over and underestimation causes loss in different architecture of our model space. Further-
more, we shall also answer that when the communication structure should be so designed
that the previous decision of accepting or rejecting projects is, or not, transmitted to the
later decision-maker with respect to the comparative advantages over decision-making ef-
fectiveness (this line of study presented in Chapter 4).
1.3 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized into six chapters. After having briefly introduced the research
background and thesis objectives, the first line of the study on organizing overlapped NPD
processes is presented in Chapter 2 1. A review of the existing methods is presented, fol-
lowed by a modelling of the nature of design specifications through an information uncer-
tainty approach which is linked to the process workload. Then, the effect of overlapping
on lead-time, design quality, rework, and total workload are derived by taking overlapping
strategies as strategic variables. The model is applied to a numerical example where a set
of overlapping strategies are compared. An industrial application is also summarized in
Appendix A.
1Chapter 2 is published as: Zhang, Dingyu, and Nadia Bhuiyan. “A study of the evolution of uncertainty
in product development as a basis for overlapping.” Engineering Management, IEEE Transactions on 62.1
(2015): 39-50.
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Chapter 3 2 reports the research results on the interactive role between organizational
structure and process. It follows the same structure starting with a comprehensive review
of the existing knowledge. Then, it provides a generic approach to the modelling of orga-
nizational structure and process along with a team solution method with which simplified
limits are addressed. The model applied to the concurrent NPD activities is then compared
to empirics in the literature. Finally the model is extended to investigate the static as well
as dynamic fitness between the dyadic attributes, i.e., organizational structure and process,
with respect to key variables such as organizational model and assignment in process vari-
ation.
The last line of study is presented in Chapter 4 3. It starts with reviewing the relevant
knowledge. A general model consists of decision and information structure is then intro-
duced. A single agent case is studied under a different information structure, i.e., specialty,
before a decision-making team of two-agent is considered. On the one hand, stylized, or
discrete, treatment of information structure is used for the purpose of producing the results
more illustratively. Continuous information structure, on the other hand, is also analyzed
to draw generalized managerial implications. Finally, the communication structure where
decisions made by former agents are, or not, disclosed to the latter is studied under the
assumption of herd-like behaviour. The last chapter, Chapter 5, concludes the thesis con-
tribution by highlighting the managerial implications drawn from each line of the studies.
Potential opportunities for future research are also summarized in this chapter.
2Chapter 3 is resubmitted to Organization Science: Zhang, Dingyu, Nadia Bhuiyan, and Linghua Kong.
“An analysis of organizational structure in process variation.”
3Chapter 4 is submitted to Organization Science: Zhang, Dingyu, Yaqiao Li, and Nadia Bhuiyan. “Design
of team specialty for decision making structures.”
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Chapter 2
A Study of the Evolution of Uncertainty
in Product Development as a Basis for
Overlapping
c⃝2015 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Zhang, Dingyu and Nadia Bhuiyan, A
Study of the Evolution of Uncertainty in Product Development as a Basis for Overlapping,
Engineering Management, IEEE Transactions on, Feb. 2015
2.1 Abstract
Overlapping new product design process is widely applied in industry. However, selec-
tions of appropriate overlapping strategies based on the prediction of process performance
can be problematic due to insufficient understanding on the dependency between design
processes and its effect on the performance. This paper introduces a new model for a
product design organization that is based on the evolving nature of the design process, the
dependency between up- and downstream design specifications, and the design technology
being adopted. The model presents an evaluation method for quantifying the downstream
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evolutionary behaviour. Through an industrial case study, it is applied to evaluate how
the design performances vary under different overlapping strategies and how to determine
an optimal overlapping; the results imply that the performance is contingent on the strat-
egy, and no single strategy outperforms in overall performance measures. Furthermore, the
model measures process dependency—a quantification of the downstream work that is in-
different to the change of the upstream. This quantification can be applied to determine the
rework probability or rework function proposed by other studies. The model also addresses
the rationale of how improving design technology efficiency can lead to an upgrading of
design performances.
2.2 Introduction
Numerous empirical studies have confirmed that overlapping new product development
(NPD) activities is in general a successful strategy for reducing time-to-market (e.g., Swink
et al., 2006; Terwiesch & Loch, 1999). However, due to the inherently complex nature of
the dependent behaviour of the overlapping processes (Simon, 1996), it is difficult to predict
the design performances under varying overlapping policies, thus leading to an ineffective
determination in terms of the timing of overlap, the communication intensity, and other
decision variables (Le et al., 2012). This ineffectiveness usually result in higher cost due
to increased rework (iteration) and communication (Lin et al., 2009; Loch & Terwiesch,
1998). Rework is a solution for coping with upstream changes when downstream starts
with preliminary information from upstream (Hauptman & Hirji, 1996; Terwiesch, Loch, &
Meyer, 2002); whereas communication is necessary in resolving information discrepancy
between up- and downstream (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991). Thus, a better understanding of
the dependent behaviour of NPD processes is vital to the decision making whereby the cost
of rework and communication is determined. Although there have been extensive studies
on the overlapping problem, this dependent behaviour of up- and downstream still lacks a
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rigorous link with the physical properties of the products that are designed.
In the extant literature, a number of models exist. Krishnan et al. (1997) characterized
upstream behaviour as an evolution function of time, and downstream dependency as a
rework function of upstream information change. Their framework can provide estimated
completion time of two dependent tasks under varying overlapping strategies and suggests
situations under which overlapping is most adaptive. In relation to the risk of rework, other
analytical models consider communication as an influential factor and investigate how it
may mitigate the impact of downstream rework resulting from uncertain initial information
(e.g., Lin et al., 2010; Loch & Terwiesch, 1998; Tyagi, Yang, Tyagi, & Dwivedi, 2011).
As outlined by Roemer & Ahmadi (2004) and Jun et al. (2005), the question of how
to rigorously determine the behaviour of up- and downstream dependency is unclear. Two
common assumptions in NPD literature are (a) the downstream sensitivity is modelled as
rework probability or degree of rework (Lin et al., 2009), which is estimated through inter-
views with experienced managers and/or through survey of historical design data (Ahmad
et al., 2013; Bogus, Diekmann, Molenaar, Harper, Patil, & Lee, 2011; Bogus, Molenaar,
& Diekmann, 2005; Browning & Eppinger, 2002; Cho & Eppinger, 2005; Jun et al., 2005;
Smith & Eppinger, 1997b; Wang & Lin, 2009; Wang & Yan, 2005; Yang et al., 2014a).
(b) It is modelled as a function of upstream progress where the assumption is that a longer
intermediate review period causes more rework (Lin et al., 2010; Loch & Terwiesch, 1998;
Roemer & Ahmadi, 2004; Roemer et al., 2000; Tyagi et al., 2011). It is suggested that while
the former assumption is a simplification of the NPD process, it entails subjective errors
in estimating the dependency; whereas the second assumption captures what is observed
but does not directly address how to derive the function from engineering data (Jun et al.,
2005).
More recent studies model the relationship through a more explicit functional form that
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links the dependency of information and the downstream progress. Lin et al. (2012) esti-
mate the degree of rework in relation to the rate of design progress and the rate of upstream
change. This line of study also extends to the result that the dependency is a multiplication
of upstream variability with downstream sensitivity (Qian & Lin, 2014). Similarly, Yang,
Zhang, & Yao (2012) and Yang et al. (2014b) propose a metric by combining the features
of upstream evolution and downstream sensitivity in multiple development processes. The
degree of rework is also modelled as a function of downstream progress and the value is de-
creasing return to the number of iterations (Lin, Chai, Wong, & Brombacher, 2008; Tyagi
et al., 2011). Another line of study by Chua and Hossain consider the rework probabil-
ity of each activity as a chance of rework caused by all its predecessors when the initial
information are not confirmed (Chua & Hossain, 2011; Hossain & Chua, 2014).
The literature has shown that one key part in most of NPD analytical methods is the
modelling of up- and downstream relationship. This modelling evolves from taking simple
assumptions to establishing complex functions. However, it is believed that the rudimental
causes for this up- and downstream dependency are the physical relationships among the
product’s parts that constraints the decision making in NPD. In the aforesaid literature, this
knowledge regarding to how physical relationships alter the up- and downstream depen-
dency is only indirectly addressed, and this knowledge is key to the nature of NPD per se.
In this study, we propose a new model for overlapping activities in which the up- and down-
stream dependency is derived directly from the physical characteristics of the products. A
method for estimating the magnitude of rework is presented, as well as the downstream
evolutionary behaviour associated with this rework. Additionally, a measure that can be
used by other studies as a quantification of rework function or rework probability is dis-
cussed. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.3 introduces the
model. Section 2.4 presents an evaluation method for the model. Section 2.5 applies the
model to the analysis of an industrial case study. Section 2.6 compares and contrasts the
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model to the literature and discusses applications of the up- and downstream dependency
to the NPD organization. The paper ends with a conclusion in Section 2.7.
2.3 Model Constructs
We follow the information-based view in Alexander (1964) and treat each task in a
design project as an information processing unit which receives information from the other
units and produces a unique design specification. The evolving nature of each unit, up- or
downstream, is captured by an evolution function of time whereby information, in terms
of design specifications, shared with its downstream unit is determined. In addition, the
evolving nature of the downstream unit depends on the content of upstream information
and the timing of the overlap and hence, it is decisive to the performance of the design
project. We begin with defining the concepts of the evolution function and the information,
then model this dependency.
2.3.1 Evolution Function and Information
It has been confirmed that for a design task (i), the variation of the relative amount
of the remaining expected work (Ui) with the time spent (t) can be estimated in practice
(e.g., Krishnan, 1993). In particular, this relationship is modelled by an evolution func-
tion of time (Ui(t)). Throughout this study, this function is assumed to be; (1) continuous,
(2) monotonically decreasing with time under sequential engineering (when task is imple-
mented without overlapping), (3) reducing to 0 at the termination of the task.
In the literature, the information to be shared by a unit has been modelled via a prob-
ability distribution over some design scope of the specification (Krishnan, 1993; Krishnan
et al., 1997; Levardy & Browning, 2009; Yang et al., 2014a). This design scope refers to a
range wherein the ultimate value of the specification will finally lie, whereas the probability
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distribution conveys the likelihood of each value inside the scope being the ultimate value.
In this study, the information for a design task (i) at time t is defined as a set, discrete or
continuous, over which a probability function is assigned. Moreover, the probability distri-
bution varies during the design period as the scope narrows—there will be fewer positively
valued probabilities, and finally there will be only one value, or one interval in the contin-
uous case, left with certainty (p = 1). As a matter of fact, a discrete design scope indicates
that designers can definitely distinguish each value in the set from the others. For exam-
ple, in airplane conceptual design, the configuration of empennage should be determined
within a discrete set which usually includes the forms of conventional, T-tail, cruciform,
H-tail, Triple-tail, V-tail, twin-tail, etc. In contrast, a continuous design scope indicates that
designers cannot, at least within some intervals, distinguish each value from the others. For
example, airplane engine propulsive efficiency is continuous and if its design precision is





δ]) are all acceptable specifications. However, it may be different when two









their nominal values, a− δ and a, are distinguishable at δ level. In the following sections,
we introduce methods for modelling discrete and continuous information.
2.3.2 Information—Discrete Case
The discrete information shared to downstream, in other words, the discrete set with a
probability mass function (PMF), represents the work progress of the unit, thus relating to
the remaining expected work, or the evolution function. For the modelling of this relation-
ship, a few requirements are considered. (1) The remaining expected work must increase
with the size of the discrete set, ceteris paribus. This implies that the larger the number of
candidates of the design specification, the more work remains. (2) The remaining expected
work must decrease with the efficiency of the design technology being adapted (Hsieh &
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Chen, 2011; Iansiti, 1995; Thomke, 1997). Here the technology implies the number of can-
didates that can be simultaneously processed, tested, or decided upon, by the information
processing unit. When a more efficient design technology is applied, the capability of the
unit in information processing increases, thus reducing the remaining expected work. (3)
The remaining expected work, if it is measured by the required expected number of tests,
should not exceed the size of the discrete set. In accordance with Simon (1996), designers
are not to optimize by testing every design candidate in the set, but rather require a satis-
factory one after a certain period of searching. Actually, only a small portion of this whole
set is conducted during the NPD process. (4) At the end of a task, the remaining expected
work reduces to zero while the PMF contains only one element with a positive probability,
which is the ultimate design specification.
In this study, the simplest relationship is considered to be that the remaining expected
work is quantified as the expectation of the number of tests needed. In relation to the
information, as per Shannon & Weaver (1949), it is formulated as (time is measured from




pj(t) loga pj(t) (2.3.1)
where n is the number of elements in the initial discrete set; p(t) is the PMF over the el-
ements; and a is a measure of the design technology being adapted. Mathematically, this
quantification of Ui(t) in (2.3.1) is an expectation of the number of trials required in search-
ing for the right value given the information (PMF) (Abbas, 2006). It is variable with the
technology (a) which quantifies the number of elements that can be processed in each trial.
It can be easily shown that (2.3.1) satisfies the four requirements stated earlier. Moreover,
Equation (2.3.1) is a well-known result as the definition of the information uncertainty,
or information entropy (Jaynes, 1957; Shannon & Weaver, 1949); hence, the remaining
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expected work for a unit can be interpreted as the uncertainty about its information evolu-
tion. Throughout this article, the expected work and the information uncertainty are used
interchangeably.
2.3.3 Information—Continuous Case
It is worth noting that the extent to which values are distinguishable differ from con-
tinuous information to discrete information. In discrete case, every value is distinct from
any other. In continuous set, any design dimension is restricted to its fabrication precision
which cannot be infinitesimal and due to errors, fabrication towards an exact value is un-
realistic. Therefore, it is usually that more than one value may be considered as feasible
design specifications, which implies that one method for discretizing the continuous set is
through chopping the set into distinct intervals. In practice, this interval can refer to those
values within upper and lower specification limits. Engineers define upper and lower spec-
ification limits and consider any value within the limits acceptable. Moreover, the limits
also vary case by case. In order to model this feature, we introduce design precision (δ).
Two common factors that alter design precision are, in relation to manufacturing precision,
the engineering upper and lower limits of the specification, and the precision of the equip-
ment when testing is performed. In the following model, design precision determines the
size of the interval.
For a continuous set, we assume that for any small interval [a, a+ δ], its nominal value
is the median (a+ 1
2
δ), and any design outcome lies within this small interval is equivalent
to this median. Consider a continuous set [a, b] in R with a probability density function
(PDF), f(x), the discretized set is defined as a combination of the nominal value of each
small interval {a+ 1
2
δi|i = 1, ..., k}, where k is the number of intervals 1. For each interval,
the PMF derived from PDF is, p(a+ 1
2
δi) = F (a+ 1
2
δi)− F (a+ 1
2
δ(i− 1)), i = 1, ..., k,
1For simplicity, we assume that the following relationship holds δ = b−ak , where k is chosen such that δ
approximates true design precision requirement. The error becomes negligible when δ ≪ (b− a).
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where F (x) is the cumulative distribution function for f(x).
In addition to the design technology (a) in (2.3.1), which is an efficiency measure,
the continuous information involves design precision (δ) which can be considered as an
effectiveness measure. The relationships between this discretized information and the re-
maining expected work of the information precessing unit follow the same logic as shown
in the preceding section and can be estimated by (2.3.1).
2.3.4 Rework Estimation and Information Dependency
The model elements defined in the preceding section are valid for all information pro-
cessing units including those of the downstream. However, under overlapping, incomplete
initial upstream information may lead to downstream rework that alters the evolution func-
tion. It is known that the degree of the rework is related to the information dependency
between up- and downstream, and to the evolving nature of the downstream unit. In this
study, this rework is defined through a standard process.
When an upstream unit (X) evolves at time t1, it sends some information (pX(t1)) to a
downstream unit (Y ). The downstream starts with this initial information and generates its
own information (pY |X). Since pX(t1) is incomplete, it ensures that only partial work done
by the downstream is effective. Hence, at the downstream time t, the discrepancy, if any,
between this effective work and the actual downstream progress is the rework (R). Since
the order of work done by the downstream affects the analysis, we assume that it remains
the same as in sequential engineering and that it starts with the jobs that are dependent
on the upstream information. Furthermore, we also assume there is no learning effect that
the rework should be similar to the evolving nature as defined in the evolution function.
Therefore, the rework can be modelled as
R(t) = UY (t
′)− UY (t) t′ ≤ t ≤ tc (2.3.2)
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′, and is the time until which
the work ensured by the initial upstream information is completed. Therefore, UY (t′) im-
plies the magnitude to which the initial information is going to decrease the uncertainty of
the downstream processing unit. On the other hand, the second part (UY (t)) is the actual
progress as measured by the remaining expected work at time t. Hence, Equation (2.3.2)
quantifies the difference between the actual work and the effective work—a measure of re-
work. It should be noted that when t < t′ as in a period for implementing the effective work,
we consider the discrepancy to be negligible (R(t) = 0). Furthermore, Equation (2.3.2) is
restricted by an upper bound tc which is defined as the time until which a final upstream
information is going to decrease the uncertainty of the downstream processing unit; its
magnitude corresponds to the up- and downstream information dependency and can be




′, whereA ∈ pY |Xfinal .
In relation to the assumption made earlier on the order of work, tc separates the entire
downstream time frame into two parts: (1) work dependent on the upstream information
(t ≤ tc) and (2) work independent of the upstream information (Figure 2.1). Therefore, the
magnitude of tc is reflective of the degree of up- and downstream dependency. Consider two
extreme situations when the information sent from upstream is finalized. If the up- and the
downstream design specifications are independent, the expected benefit from receiving the
upstream information will be zero; and hence, tc = 0, or there will be no rework generated
by this information. On the other hand, if the relationship is functionally dependent, the
downstream specification will be determined once the upstream information is complete
tc = t
downstream
final (there will be no remaining independent work). Time tc thus varies with
the information dependency. In general, the greater the information dependency between
up- and downstream, the larger is tc. It will be later shown that both the magnitudes of tc
and U(tc) are closely related to the analysis of various design strategies; and (tc, U(tc)) is
called the critical point in the later analysis (Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Downstream evolution function: critical point and critical time.
In conclusion, Equation (2.3.2) is one way to estimate rework through information de-
pendency and the timing of overlap. Upon receiving the updated information from up-
stream, this rework leads to a rise in the remaining expected work for the downstream. In
theory, the evolution nature of the downstream under overlapping can be predicted with
some evaluation method of (2.3.2). Nevertheless, any evaluation method requires, ex-ante,
the knowledge about how the information, that is the discrete set with a PMF or the contin-
uous set with a PDF, of both up- and downstream units varies. Hence, the prediction of a
downstream evolution function demands extra assumptions about the variation of this infor-
mation. In this study, the method applied is based on the principle of maximum uncertainty
(Jaynes, 1957).
2.4 Evaluation Method
This section develops an evaluation method that is applicable to NPD organizations
in which the initial, individual or joint, discrete sets for the units can be determined. As
drawn from the concept of set-based design, the joint discrete set (for units i, j, ...) follows
20
the structure as:
Ωi,j,... = {(specification i, specification j, ...), ...} = {(red, high, ...), ...}. (2.4.1)
As will be shown later, this structure can also be alternatively represented by tabulating
the specifications with their relationships. It contains the initial solution set of the design
variables, which is a group of possible design combinations. This initial information is
generally viable for the product where major design is an improvement of some older ver-
sion, i.e., incremental innovation. As a result, the initial sets can be based on the historical
development records, the engineer’s experience, the manufacturing standards, and the func-
tional demands (Chua & Hossain, 2011). Moreover, this information is an estimation of
the dependency between up- and downstream, and its strict validation is considered as the
task of NPD.
2.4.1 Probability Estimation
In order to estimate the distribution function for design information, we apply the prin-
ciple of maximum uncertainty (Jaynes, 1957). The principle states that the least-biased









p(xi) = 1 (2.4.3)
f(p) ≥ 0, f(p) = b (2.4.4)
p(xi) ∈ [0, 1] for all i
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whereX = {x1, ..., xn} is the design set, and pX is the density function. Constraints (2.4.3)
and (2.4.4) represent the ex-ante knowledge about X . This knowledge alters the density
function under the principle of maximum uncertainty and in turn, it affects, by (2.3.1), the
relationship between the remaining expected work and the information. Since an ex-ante
knowledge about X is usually very limited, it is of our particular interest to first consider a
general case in which the information processing units have no extra knowledge about the
design specification.
Limited Knowledge—Simple Information Assumption
Consider the information processing units possess, at any time, no information except
the remaining expected work (high vs low). This assumption is consistent with Krishnan
et al. (1997) and follows from the reality that one cannot precisely predict the exact infor-
mation about the discrete set, rather one can only estimate the scope of the design as related
by the evolution function. In addition, the assumption removes the constraints (2.4.4) in
the optimization problem. The remainder can be solved by introducing Lagrangian multi-
plier, and through the usual calculation we have p(xi) = 1n , for all i. Suppose the discrete




, where n(•) is a function measuring the size, or the cardinality, of the set
X t. Eventually, for any discrete set Ωi at time t, by (2.3.1), the relationship between the
remaining expected work and the information is
Ui(t) = loga n(Ω
t
i) (2.4.5)
The PMF in (2.4.5) follows uniform distribution. In the extant literature, both uniform and
non-uniform distributions over the discrete set are suggested (e.g., Krishnan, 1993; Levardy
& Browning, 2009). Hence, we now turn to the non-simple information assumption.
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The Effect of Extra Knowledge
When constraints (2.4.4) convey extra knowledge about design specification, applying
the principle of maximum uncertainty will yield a non-uniform distribution. To illustrate,
consider an example in camera design, if engineers have an initial belief that a final cam-
era resolution is more likely to be over 20 megapixels, the initial probability distribution
(p(0)) would be non-uniform with this information being added. Furthermore, with extra
information added would decrease the initial uncertainty of the design process (the over-
all expected work). This intuitive result follows from the fact that the uncertainty defined
in (2.3.1) reaches maximum when the probability is uniformly distributed, and any non-
uniform distribution adds certain degree of certainty, thus reducing the uncertainty. Hence,
the overall expected work is smaller when more information is available than is the case
with no extra information. However, in addition to the evolutionary behaviour of the infor-
mation processing unit, the knowledge generated during the design process which changes
the information (p(t)) is unobservable, ex-ante, because it is the job of NPD per se. In this
article, the initial non-uniform distribution is considered as a result of adding extra knowl-
edge, and the assumption of limited knowledge is made during the design process. Even
though, by having some initial extra knowledge would linearly reduce the workload at any
time t.
2.4.2 Downstream Rework
In order to evaluate downstream behaviour, the information shared from upstream is
important. The first step is to determine the total expected work (U(0)). For non-uniform
information, this value is given by (2.3.1), and uniform information by (2.4.5). Equa-
tion (2.4.5) also links the evolving nature of the unit (the evolution function) with the scope
of the design. At any time, the amount of information that can be shared to downstream is
determined by first referring to the remaining expected work (U(t)), and then solving the
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range (n(Ωti)) as a variable through (2.4.5). During the overlap, this information being sent
determines, in part, the degree of effective work to which the downstream evolves. Since
we assume the content of the discrete set is not known, ex-ante, the range of the down-
stream discrete set can only be inferred from the range of the exchanged information from
the upstream. Hence we consider an expectation of range as the dependent measure of the
information for the downstream discrete set.
This expectation measure is defined as:
nj = E[n(Ωj|i)|n(Ωti)] (2.4.6)
To illustrate the calculation of this measure, consider an example which is an joint discrete
set
ΩX,Y = {{U1, D1}, {U1, D2}, {U2, D2}, {U2, D3}, {U2, D4}, {U3, D4}, {U4, D3}}2
(2.4.7)
If the upstream evolution function at time t predicts, through (2.4.5), the design process
is evolved to the extent that the discrete set only has three elements left. Then, without
knowing which three are left exactly, we should estimate and calculate the expected size of
downstream discrete set. In this case, 3 different Us are drawn from the set (the information





= 4 different combinations of the information. And for
each combination (j), we calculate the number of different Ds (zj3)which satisfies the joint








2The joint set can be alternatively represented by a table form as will be shown in section 2.5.
3 z13 : {{U1, D1}, {U1, D2}, {U2, D2}, {U2, D3}, {U2, D4}, {U3, D4}},
z23 : {{U1, D1}, {U1, D2}, {U2, D2}, {U2, D3}, {U2, D4}, {U4, D3}},
z33 : {{U1, D1}, {U1, D2}, {U3, D4}, {U4, D3}},
z43 : {{U2, D2}, {U2, D3}, {U2, D4}, {U3, D4}, {U4, D3}}
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By (2.4.6), given n(ΩtX) = 3, the dependent measure of the downstream information is










) = 3.75. (2.4.8)
Equation (2.4.6) is calculated through taking the weighted average over all possible
sizes each of which satisfies the given upstream information and the joint design scope.
Moreover, as a property, this expectation measure increases with the size of upstream in-
formation. In other words, it implies the practice that the more the upstream information
evolves and shares, the more benefit the downstream has (the proof for this monotonicity
is available from the authors).




t′ ≤ t ≤ tc (2.4.9)
where T is the overlapping time, measured from the upstream unit (i), when the informa-
tion is sent to the downstream unit (j), and t′ and tc are the solutions to the downstream
evolution functions
Uj(t
′) = logaE[n(Ωj|i)|n(Ωti)] (2.4.10)
and
Uj(tc) = logaE[n(Ωj|i)|1] (2.4.11)
respectively. It follows immediately that the hours of rework (H), is
Hj(t) = t− t′ t′ ≤ t ≤ tc. (2.4.12)
In the most general form, when a downstream unit (s) is dependent on multiple upstream
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units (i, j, k, ...), Equation (2.4.9) extends to
R(t) = loga
E[n(Ωs|i,j,k,...)|n(ΩTi ), n(ΩTj ), n(ΩTk ), ...]
n(Ωts)
t′ ≤ t ≤ tc. (2.4.13)
As caused by overlapping product design processes, this modelling of the rework is
decisive to the estimation of the downstream evolution function which in turn, enables the
prediction of NPD performances—lead time, total work load, and design quality. While in
a managerial situation, a number of overlapping strategies exists, this model may provide
managers with an analysis on the NPD performances when different strategies are applied,
thus improving the effectiveness of decision making in NPD.
2.5 Example and Numerical Experiments
In this section, we provide a case of an industrial NPD process. Through interview, the
information provided by the engineers has revealed three key design specifications X ,Y ,
and Z. TaskX is the upstream since it determines the performance of the machine, whereas
Y and Z are sequentially dependent on X . Based on prior data, engineers estimate the joint
discrete sets for the design specifications (Figure 2.2). Furthermore, the evolving natures
for X , Y , and Z are estimated and they are fast, slow, and fast, respectively (Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.2: Left: Elements of joint discrete set for X-Y; right: Elements of joint discrete
set for X-Z
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Figure 2.3: Evolution functions with time (days) for the design variables X, Y , and Z
It is obvious that 42 days are the total expected lead time of the NPD process under
sequential engineering. But this time can be improved by overlapping the design tasks.
Through the analysis of downstream evolutionary behaviour, the following analysis pro-
vides the engineers and the managers with the estimation of the NPD performance, in
terms of lead time, rework, quality loss, and total work hours, under various overlapping
strategies.
2.5.1 Model Input Determination
Throughout the analysis, the assumptions of simple information made in the preceding
sections hold. In addition, for the ease of calculation, we shall first consider the quantifi-
cation of the design technology (a) as fixed at e = 2.718. This is because taking it as a
constant does not alter the analysis and the implication drawn from the model results. At the
end, we treat a as an exogenous variable, and analyze its effect on the NPD performances.
To calculate the base value of the expected total work, by (2.4.5), we have UX(0) =
lnn(Ω0X) = ln 10, UY (0) = lnn(Ω
0
Y ) = ln 9, UZ(0) = lnn(Ω
0
Z) = ln 7. These quantifi-
cations imply the magnitude of the number of tests or decisions (high vs. low) needed to
determine the satisfied machine specifications within the design scope at the outset.
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Given the complete information from X , by (2.4.6), the expected sizes for the depen-
dent units (Y and Z) are cY = 2.4 and cZ = 1.9, respectively. By (2.4.5), the critical time
(tYc and t
Z
c ) for the dependent units (Y and Z) are the solutions to UY (t
Y
c ) = ln cY and
UZ(t
Z
c ) = ln cZ , respectively.
For downstream units Y andZ, the calculations yield two critical points that are (25.2, ln 2.4)
and (1.5, ln 1.9), as shown in Figure 2.3. Each point separates the total downstream work
into two parts: dependent work and independent work. The dependent part indicates an
expected contribution on which the upstream design information may help decrease the
downstream uncertainty. According to the monotonic property, Equation (2.4.6) implies
that the more specific the upstream information that is shared with the downstream, the
more the downstream work will be resolved. But this work will be bounded by the critical
point; the lower point the more sensitive the relationship between the up- and downstream
design variables.
2.5.2 Early Partial Information Sharing to Y —Effect on Lead Time
This section evaluates the effect of overlapping X and Y at day 7 on the NPD per-
formance (Figure 2.4a). At time t = 7, the remaining expected work of the upstream is
ln 2, and by (2.4.5), the size of the discrete set is n(Ω1X) = 2. Given this upstream in-
formation, by (2.4.5) and (2.4.6), the remaining expected downstream work is UY |X(3) =
lnE[(n(Ω21Y |X)|n(Ω7X)] = ln 4.28 where the time t = 21 is the solution to UY |X(t) =
ln 4.28 (point A in Figure 2.4a). The model shows that if the upstream shares informa-
tion at day 7, the degree of the expected work through which the downstream may ben-
efit is the subtraction of the remaining expected work from the total initial work, that is
ln 9 − ln 4.28 = 0.74. In other words, partial information sharing at week 1 will help de-
crease the downstream uncertainty by 34%. The time for the downstream design evolution
to reach this progress is, due to its evolving nature, about 21 days.
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Figure 2.4: a. Sharing partial information b. sharing frozen information—to downstream
unit Y at t=day 7
As the complete information from the upstream will be sent at day 14 while the down-
stream is still on the way to reach point A, the downstream effort will not be futile. And
as expected the downstream will reach completion at the end of the fourth week. Thus,
the total lead time under this strategy will be one week shorter than when under sequential
organization. In conclusion, overlapping at day 7 could avoid rework for the downstream
unit (since we assume during the course of implementing effective dependent work, rework
is negligible). The model applied here implies that there exists, at least in theory, a manage-
rial condition where rework can be effectively avoided. Additionally, the result drawn from
the model suggests that this condition usually occurs when upstream evolves so quickly
and downstream evolves slowly.
On the other hand, the model is in line with what many studies have shown that slow
evolution and high uncertainty exacerbate the overlapping performances (Krishnan et al.,
1997; Terwiesch & Loch, 1999). Consider the case where upstream evolves slowly such
that by day 7, it can only provide limited information which does not help prompt the
downstream work resolution. Hence, the downstream may overtake upstream progress (in
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this case, point A would move upward overtaking point B), and proceed upon the basis of
unknown information. Rework as a price must be paid for such a walk in the dark. We
shall explore this effect in detail in Section 2.5.4.
2.5.3 Early Frozen Information Sharing to Y —Effect on Quality Loss
Early frozen information may cause quality loss in product development (Krishnan
et al., 1997). The relationship defined in (2.3.1) could play a role in measuring the quality
loss by the monotonic property of the evaluation method and the belief that an earlier frozen
time should result in a higher loss in quality. We shall evaluate the same design variables
X and Y under the strategy that the information is frozen at week 1, and explore the quality
losses in the up- and the downstream respectively.
If the upstream closes the information at t = 7 (Figure 2.4b), its remaining expected
work remains at ln 2, and in turn, the loss in quality is caused by the commensurate uncer-
tainty ln 2, which is about 30% of the total remaining expected work (the expected number
of tests or decisions missed). Moreover, an earlier closed design corresponds to a greater
uncertainty remaining, causing higher loss in its quality.
On the other hand, by (2.4.9), the loss in the downstream design caused by the unso-
phisticated upstream information is calculated as ln 4.28− ln 2.4 = 0.58. This value equals
the difference in the downstream uncertainty between points A and C (Figure 2.4b). It
amounts to the rework as measured at time tc, or R(tc). In other words, 0.58 out of ln 9, or
26%, uncertainty will remain in designing Y which is not rectifiable, and recall that it is a
part of the dependent uncertainty.
2.5.4 Ordinary Overlap—Early Partial Information Sharing to Z
This section studies the lead time of downstream with respect to overlapping. Suppose
only preliminary information from upstream is available during overlapping. Then for the
30
problem as shown in Fig 2.5 where information is shared at ts, let te and td be the durations
of up- and downstream processes, respectively, and denote to as the duration of overlap and
H(ts) as rework. We consider an optimization model that minimizes lead time,
min T (ts) =te + td − to +H(ts) (2.5.1)
subject to: to = te − ts (2.5.2)
H(ts) = tc − t′ (2.5.3)
Eqs. (2.4.10), and (2.4.11)
0 ≤ ts ≤ te (2.5.4)
Figure 2.5: An ordinary overlapping model for two processes
The optimal timing of overlap (t˜s) can be approximately solved by the following one-
dimensional search algorithm.
Initial step: Let δ be the search step length; initialize ts = δ.
Step 1) Given upstream evolution function, solve the upstream information (n(Ωtsup)) by
(2.4.5).
Step 2) Given the upstream information, solve the effective work to which the downstream
evolves by (2.4.6). Through (2.4.10) and (2.4.11) and finally by (2.5.3), calculate the re-
work time (H(ts)).
Step 3) Solve the total lead time (T (ts)) by (2.5.1) and if it is the minimum so far, save
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Tmin := T (ts) and t˜s := ts.
Step 4) If ts + δ < te, ts := ts + δ, go step 1; otherwise stop.
Following this algorithm, we evaluate the performance of the overlapped information
processing system (system X and Z with the search step length δ = 1 day). As can be seen
in Figure 2.6, the degree of rework increases with the degree of overlap, while the lead
time first decreases and then increases as the degree of rework compensates the degree of
overlap. The optimal overlapping is found at t˜s = 9 day and the lead time is Tmin = 14.3
day. The result suggests that, as shown in Figure 2.7a, the downstream starts at day 9
and achieves the completion of the effective dependent work. The downstream receives
the final information at t = 14 day; it decides to rectify a portion of the work where
unknown information was used. In other words, it will rework l as sophisticated upstream
information is now available. By (2.4.9), l = R(tc) = 0.56.
Figure 2.6: Overlapping timing vs. rework and lead time
On the other hand, the lead time (14.3 days) is shorter than under the sequential en-
gineering (19 days). However, the total work hours for the downstream increases to 5 +
H(tc) = 5.94 days, or by about 20%. This calculation is an approximation as we assume
the effort made under uncertain information is completely futile. However there is a prob-
ability 1
n(ΩtX)
that the work done by downstream in the first iteration is consistent with the
final upstream information. In other words, the downstream knows the final upstream infor-
mation could be one of n(ΩtX), but does not exactly know which one it will be. Moreover,
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it has one in n(ΩtX) chance that the guess is correct and the rework is avoided. Thus, pre-
cisely deriving, the expected rework should be (1− 1
n(ΩtX)
)(tc − td), which is less than l as
derived by (2.4.9). But when n(ΩtX) is large, this effect can be negligible.
Aside from this ordinary overlap, strategies like functional interaction, starvation, and
duplication are supplementary to the organizations of the overlapped tasks. Consistent with
previous literature, (e.g. Bhuiyan et al., 2004; Lin et al., 2009; Loch & Terwiesch, 1998),
we refer to functional interaction as a strategy for up- and downstream to reach a consensus
at the beginning of the process, i.e., the degree to which downstream could proceed free of
rework, given initial upstream information. In other words, functional interaction enables,
regarding downstream units, the making of effective progress based on initial information.
On the other hand, by Terwiesch et al. (2002), starvation refers to the process that the
downstream decides to wait until the complete information is received; whereas duplication
means, following functional interaction and initial information, the downstream enumerates
every possible upstream results, and conducts multiple design tasks on each of them. All
these strategies, as means for the rework elimination, are a kind of work load-lead time
trade-off, and the analysis follows.
2.5.5 Functional Interaction with Starvation
In this analysis, one day is assumed for X and Z to discuss and calculate the degree
to which an early information sent at day 9, which is the optimal solution under ordinary
overlapping, is going to reduce the downstream uncertainty. Through this functional inter-
action, the evolution function of Z first remains at the initial level for functional interaction
and then, by (2.4.6), it can at most proceed to point D, as shown in Figure 2.7b, without
the penalty of rework (which corresponds to only a half-day, overdo will result in rework).
In contrast to the ordinary overlap, Z decides to apply starvation till the final information
from X is available (the horizontal line starts with D). This could be economic since such
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Figure 2.7: Sending partial information to downstream unit Z at t= 9 under a. normal b.
starvation c. duplication strategies
waiting may save resources (McDaniel, 1996). As a result, the total lead time is 18.5 days,
but the work hours for Z is 6 days including design and coordination. Although it does not
give a sharp comparison between this overlapping strategy and the ordinary, starvation can
be efficient when the cost per design hour is high and the functional interaction cost is low
(sometimes a short meeting may serve the purpose).
2.5.6 Functional Interaction with Duplication
Followed by functional interaction, Z could alternatively apply the strategy of duplica-
tion for reducing the risk of rework. By (2.4.9), the measure of the rework R(tc), or curve
DC as shown in Figure 2.7c, is subject to the upstream information change; and Z does
not have such information yet. Therefore, unit Z must base its activities on each possible
outcome of X , that is for each upstream possibility, Z performs the work indicated by DC.
In the case where overlapping starts at day 9, the size of the information, or the discrete set,
from X is 1.3, which suggests that Z pays (n(Ωweek1X )− 1) ·R(tc) = 0.3R(tc) extra work-
load. As shown in Figure 2.7c, the bold line delineates the revolution behaviour for X and
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Table 2.1: Model results summary: X-Z.
Organization strategy X-Z
Performance
Lead time (days) Rework (Uncertainty) Workload (Uncertainty)
Sequential Engineering (Non-overlap) 19 0* 1.95*
Ordinary Overlap (Optimal) 14.3* 0.55 2.5
Functional Interaction With Starvation 18.5 0* 1.95*
Function Interaction With Duplication 15 0* 2.12
*Best Strategy in each individual performance
Z. The duplication starts form point D and finishes when the final upstream information is
ready. The lead time is 15 days.
In conclusion, ordinary overlapping yields the shortest lead time. Table 2.1 summarizes
the NPD performances under different strategies for units X and Z. The best strategies
in terms of each individual performance are marked. As can be seen, ordinary overlap
has a moderate improvement in lead time with respect to sequential engineering at the
costs of rework and total workload. On the other hand, no unique strategy outperforms
the others in terms of overall three performance measures. This result implies that, in
general, the individual performance is contingent on the strategy adapted, and managers
and engineers should pay attention to which performance they value most, and choose
overlapping strategies based on the model in relation to the targeted performance.
2.5.7 Performance Improvement by Efficient Design Technology
So far, we have restricted our interest in the managerial strategies, i.e. overlap, however,
the design technology being adopted also plays a determining role in design performance
(Hsieh & Chen, 2011; Iansiti, 1995; Krishnan & Loch, 2005; Thomke, 1997). More effi-
cient design technology should result in a better performance; and the result of our model
supports this.
As stated earlier, variable a in (2.4.5) is a measure of design efficiency. If it is 2, it
corresponds to a ”yes/no” judgment and each test or decision can at most rule out one
element from the design set. On the other hand, if it is 100, the design technology is
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more efficient so that each test or decision could make a great leap. As stated in Loch,
Terwiesch, & Thomke (2001), this phenomenon can be considered as what happened in the
pharmaceutical industry where test techniques have vastly improved. Regarding the model,
consider a company has invested in a new technology for NPD with higher design efficiency
b (b > a). In addition, it is assumed that the initial discrete set and the evolving nature of
uncertainty remain unchanged. Because loga n > logb n, the new technology will push
the evolution function towards the lower left. In terms of the decrease of total work load,
the technology applied is at decreasing return to scale, reducing both lead time and work
load (Figure 2.8). Since explicit exploration of the new evolution function under improved
design technology demands its topological feature to be conserved, and this exceeds the
scope of this study, we only use a linear evolution function as an example, as shown in
Figure 2.8. Recall the case study, if more efficient design technologies are adopted for X
Y and Z, all the evolution functions should be shrunk towards the lower left, and the overall
performance is improved. On the other hand, if only one technology is upgraded for some
units, the overlapping strategy should be re-explored to best adapt this improvement.




In this study, the overlapping model non-linearly relates the evolution function with the
size of the design scope. Its psychological implication is similar to the marginal utility
effect in economics, and can be argued by the following experiment: ask some people to
estimate the uncertainty of a choice question that has n options, then adding one more
option and ask how they would feel regarding to the change in uncertainty. It is fair to
estimate that the change in uncertainty would be much less if n = 10 than if n = 3. Non-
linearity of this estimation is modelled by a logarithmic relationship, which is the most
conservative estimation derived by the principle of maximum uncertainty. Furthermore,
this uncertainty measures the number of guesses one needs to make in order to find the
correct answer. In the literature, analogous result can be drawn to the choice reaction time
experiment. In Hick (1952), the reaction time is found to be proportional to the logarithm
of the degree of choice which manifests the same characteristic as the relationship between
the evolution function and the discrete set (Equation (2.4.5)).
In addition, due to the fact that any downstream design, if it is not the final one, can be
treated as an upstream process relative to its own downstream processes, this model can be
used to evaluate a product development problem that involves multiple sequentially depen-
dent design specifications when downstream starts no early than upstream and in each time,
only one overlapping can occur during NPD implementation, i.e., Sashimi-style solution
(Imai, Nonaka, & Takeuchi, 1985) 4. For interdependent design tasks, or for completely
new products, however, the evaluation method developed in this study may fail. In these
cases, more assumption is needed for the method and we shall conclude this in section 2.7.
In relation to the ordinary DSM model (Smith & Eppinger, 1997b), the model in this
4We have applied the model to the overlapping processes in a design of snake robotic endoscope, the
results are summarized in Appendix A.
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study is sensitive to the degree of interdependency among design variables, and to the evo-
lutionary nature of the design. On the other hand, this model is applicable in determining
the degree of rework probability. Since it is virtually related to up- and downstream de-
pendency (Roemer et al., 2000), the rework probability can be viewed as a function of the
critical point (tc, U(tc)). As an example, one possible definition of rework probability, pro-
cessing unit Y on information change of X , is pY |X =
UY |X(0)−UY |X(tc)
UY |X(0)
, which is the ratio
of dependent work to total work. This definition has an objective basis on the dependency
between up- and downstream information. For studies that propose rework probability as
a function of time, we also suggest that the critical point may play a role. One possible
definition considers time as a variable such that the rework probability of Y on information
change of X is pY |X(t) =
UY |X(0)−UY |X(t)
UY |X(0)
, t ≤ tc, which is the ratio of dependent work to
total work as a function of time. Again this definition of the dynamic rework probability
is based on the dependency between up- and downstream information, and monotonically
increases with time which implies that a frequent review mitigates the magnitude of rework.
The concept of uncertainty in this study is modelled as the remaining expected work
in relation to the scope of the design space. It differs from the one defined in Loch &
Terwiesch (1998) where the uncertainty is characterized as the change rate in the upstream.
Similarity, the sensitivity feature is modelled by the expected scope of downstream design
variable given the upstream information. Dependency becomes a sensitivity measure that
is closely related to the nature of physical constraint among design variables.
Aside from these emphases on analytical applications, this model is also an approxi-
mation of the process of cooperative problem solving. We refer to the process as a group
of information processing units each of which can receive information from others, follow
searching algorithms and pass the result on to the units where it is needed. The evolu-
tion function is a representation of the convergent behaviour of the searching algorithm.
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Although current product design is indispensable to manpower, design by artificial intelli-
gence could be a possible outcome in future, and the implications drawn from the model
should be conserved.
Lastly, the model can be improved to provide a more accurate comparison in select-
ing the overlapping strategies if the cost coefficients of design processes are specified and
applied, i.e., payment rate, the costs for functional interaction, and information sharing.
Furthermore, since this micro-product design model is deterministic, it provides good esti-
mates under situations where design processes do not present too many complex features
such as when too many tasks are interrelated. However, if the design processes are com-
plex, the decisions based on the single value without a measure of variation is dangerous.
Hence, only treating the model elements probabilistically can yield meaningful results for
complex design processes.
2.7 Conclusions
Understanding the dependency of up- and downstream processes is a basis for effective
decision making in overlapping. Our model explicitly addresses this dependency in terms
of the evolving nature of the process and the design technology. The model shows how
the NPD performance, especially for downstream rework, can be varied under different
overlapping strategies. An evaluation method is applied for cases involving incremental
innovation and for an three-process sequential industrial example. Furthermore, the critical
point of the dependent process derived in our model can serve as an argument in determin-
ing rework probability or rework function proposed by other studies.
Some refinements of the model are possible. (1) The model does not address how the
rework can be estimated under coupled design activities; that is, the up- and downstream
discrete sets are defined interdependently. Hence, future work on this aspect is needed. (2)
Since most of NPD processes are more complex than the case we considered in this paper,
39
our next step is to apply the model to a situation where the number of processes and the
size of design spaces are both high.
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Chapter 3
An Analysis of Organizational Structure
in Process Variation
3.1 Abstract
In today’s highly uncertain and changing market environment, the need for organiza-
tional structures to respond to persistent improvement in organizational processes becomes
more critical than ever before. Current organizational studies mostly emphasize catego-
rized processes and structures and lack development of continuity in temporal and spatial
layers of environmental change. In this study, organizational structure varies along de-
partmentalization and assignment, whereas process environment changes in the space of
exploration and exploitation. We develop a systemic framework and the results are com-
pared with industrial data from new product development. We then analyze the interplay
between organizational structure and performance with coordination costs through a static
as well as dynamic process environment, and find that organizations, including organiza-
tional models and assignments, are stable at certain level in continuous process change.
The implications drawn from the results conclude a set of strategic guidelines in response
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to the need for restructuring: (1) the need for restructuring is low in short term, moder-
ate, explorative or exploitative process improvement; (2) a low level of tolerance (entailing
opportunity loss) should be used when it takes explorative, or exploitative, or both efforts
in long term, radical process improvement in order to avoid high costs of structural adjust-
ments; (3) once major process changes are completed, the alignment should be restructured
or at least improved without delay in order to avoid accumulative opportunity loss.
3.2 Introduction
The dyadic relationship between organizational process and structure has been a central
theme for decades (Thompson, 1967). Organizational theories and studies provide expla-
nations on the behaviour of organizational structure (e.g., Galbraith, 1977; Levinthal, 1997;
March & Simon, 1993; Mintzberg, 1979). These studies emphasize that one of an organi-
zation’s main function is to coordinate everyday tasks in a varying process environment,
and study how organizational structure evolves in order to respond to process variation.
It is clear that organizational structure is key in determining performance (Weber, 1947).
However, due to simplified representations, results at the organizational level are mostly
explanatory and applicable to categorized processes and structures, thus limiting direct im-
plication in terms of continuity in temporal and spatial layers of environmental change. In
today’s complex and highly uncertain and changing market environment, the need for an
organization to adapt fluidly from its structure through its processes is more critical than
ever before. Developing mechanisms that apply broadly to any organization is of primor-
dial concern to managers.
In this article, we provide a systematic framework that builds process and structure
through an information dependence matrix and coordination matrix among agents, respec-
tively. We allow the process representation to be variable in two dimensions, i.e., explo-
rative improvement and exploitative improvement (March, 1991; Tushman & O’Reilly,
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1996). Our results contribute to the current literature in two major ways. (1) For a static
process environment, the model explores, and confirms with existing explanations, the in-
terplay among the performance of organizational structure, the communication cost, and
the organizational size. (2) For a dynamic process environment, in relation to the organi-
zational model as well as agents assignment, we identify organizational stability in contin-
uous process improvement and conclude with a set of strategic guidelines in response to
the need for restructuring. We analyze the cost of restructuring and provide, from a process
dynamic perspective, an economic explanation as to how the role of structural inertia exerts
influence on old as well as young organizations with complex processes.
In the literature, Simon (1976) defines an organization as the pattern of communications
and relations among a group of human beings, including the processes for making and im-
plementing decisions. His view of organizations as information-processing units made up
of boundedly rational individuals led to an extensive amount of research on the interaction
between agents and organizational environment (Puranam, Stieglitz, Osman, & Pillutla,
2015). On the other hand, in the field of contingency theory, many authors study the ef-
fect of external environmental variables on organization design (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971;
Hage, 1965; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1999; Perrow, 1967; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner,
1968; Thompson, 1967). This approach does not consider an organization’s ability to af-
fect performance, in part by adapting to its environment. Miles, Snow, Meyer, & Coleman
(1978) states that structure and the processes within an organization are closely linked, and
that one cannot speak of one without the other. Bloisi, Cook, & Hunsaker (2007) define
organizational structure as a bringing together people and tasks into units with the aim of
improving coordination of communication, decision-making, and actions taken. Thus, one
can design a more efficient organization through a better understanding of the processes
therein.
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In his pioneering work, Alexander (1964) studies the effect of intra-organizational de-
pendence on a design task and found that the effectiveness of the task is dependent on the
degree of information dependencies among the design variables. Galbraith (1977), from
an information processing perspective, theorizes the organizational structure as a means
for reducing information uncertainty and resolving information discrepancy. Likewise,
Mintzberg (1979) demonstrates that organizations act as various ad hoc communication
structures that support the implementation of everyday tasks and processes. March & Si-
mon (1993) in contrast, analyze the behaviour of individuals in organizations, and study
how it varies with the communication structure and the information dependence. Mount
& Reiter (2002) treat organizations as combinations of calculation units of different func-
tions, and studied the behaviour of computational efficiency with communication structure
that links the units. Moreover, the possibility of whether any organizational structures and
the processes within can be quantitatively represented in a uniform manner was explored
(Mackenzie, 2013). However, the suggested framework lacks immediate applicability to
analyze dynamic process environment such as new product development (NPD) with dif-
ferent level of concurrency.
Although there has been much concern over organizational structure in the literature,
Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio (2007) point out that the role and importance of specialized
decision-making structures has been lost, further stating that it is risky for organizational
studies to ignore these foundational constructs. Cyert & March (1992) also hold the view
that an organization should be mainly described as a decision-making process. They fur-
ther question how hierarchical groups make decisions. Christensen & Knudsen (2010)
and Csaszar (2013) identify and investigate the effect of applying complex organizational
structures on the errors in decision-making. Similarly, Ioannides (2012), through a pure
mathematical approach, studies the organizational design in the case of project screening
by modelling the features of organizational architecture. He proved that the performance
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of decision-making, in terms of error reduction, can be continuously improved in a con-
vergent manner if the organization is structured properly. On the other hand, while Gibson
et al. (2015) propose a hierarchical framework to analyze the dynamic evolutionary be-
haviour for a complete structure space, process is not modelled in a comparable level of
detail. Bavelas (1948), Leavitt (1951), and Guetzkow & Simon (1955) show that simple
process performance is highly variable with the change of group communication patterns.
Marschak & Radner (1972) investigate organizational structure from a decision-making
perspective such that a group of simple communication patterns can be characterized, e.g.,
decentralized and centralized organizational structure. Fac¸anha & Resende (2010) further
discuss how the hierarchical structure of an industrial firm could be determined through a
group of pertinent organizational factors.
In relation to structural dynamics, Hannan & Freeman (1984) and Mens, Hannan, &
Po´los (2015) find that the rate of change in organizational structure is inversely propo-
sitional to its size and age, whereas Baker & Cullen (1993) claim large size has more
resource to conduct reorganizing. Haveman (1993) finds U-shaped relationship between
organizational size and flexibility to change. These seemingly inconsistent results may
have overlooked the role of process dynamics played in affecting the change of organiza-
tional structure. In this article, from another perspective, we explore this organizational
ability to change in relation to the nature of process development.
The literature clearly demonstrates the close relationship that exists between organiza-
tion structure and process, and consequently performance. The nature of the organizational
structure has a major impact on the success of organizational projects and the processes ex-
ecuted to complete them. Although the literature shows that a wide variety of mechanisms
have been adopted and studied in order to address this issue, more knowledge is required
in order to answer how the coordinated efforts of various resources within an organiza-
tion can contribute to the effective and successful execution of processes, especially in an
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environment where organizations need to adapt to process variation.
In this article, we model the effect of applying different organizational structures, in the
form of coordination structure, on process performance. We take the team decision making
approach (Marschak & Radner, 1972), which models decision processes of agents where
information, as a basis of decision making, is interdependent and represented as process
matrix. Modelling results are compared with data observed in the automotive industry and
extended to the analysis of the variation of organizational structure in response to static
as well as dynamic process environment with varying communication costs. We study
organizational structure and process in general, and conclude with a set of strategies on
how to react with process changes in specific.
3.3 Modelling Method and Solutions in Special Process
and Structure space
3.3.1 Process, Structure, and Agent
An organizational task can be considered as a process of team decision making. Agents,
or organizational members, make decisions based on the information regarding the task.
Consider a task x of n members. We denote R = {rij} as the interpersonal information
dependence matrix regarding the task, also called process structure. A non-zero value rij
indicates the relative dependence of member i’s information on j’s. In a short time period,
we assume the process is static. This representation can be easily extended in a dynamic
setting where at each time period there is a correspondingR representing the process status.
We shall clarify that R is not necessarily the same as the interdependence among tasks;
if the latter is exogenously given, the former is mostly subject to the implementation of the
tasks. As a result, the same task may have different R. Puranam, Raveendran, & Knudsen
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(2012) provide an example where the actions of two agents, i.e., one making pin heads
and another pin tails, do not depend on the information of one another if they are rewarded
based on the individual, not collective, performance. Hence, the tasks interdependence of
making a pin do not imply the interpersonal information dependence, rather the reward plan
does in this example. Moreover, it is the interpersonal information dependence serves the
basis of decision making for implementing the tasks. Another example is sequential and
concurrent engineering, which are two structures widely applied in the NPD industry. The
inter-department information dependence can vary with respect to the degree of concur-
rency whereas the dependence among tasks is stable. Starting with sequential engineering
where one’s information is most likely dependent on its immediate predecessor and suc-
cessor, more dependent relations are to be expected as the level of concurrency rises. We
shall explore this effect in section 3.3.3.
Another key attribute is organizational structure. We focus on one of its major functions
that is to facilitate the coordination of individual actions so as to balance the need for
intensive interactions among those who are intimately connected by the process with the
need for alleviating the coordination burden. We denote {qij} ∈ [0, 1] as the interaction
intensity matrix, or coordination structure, that is supported by the organization.
Let us now consider the behaviour of agent (i) that implements task processes through
a decision process αi, i.e., choosing appropriate actions (ai) based on information (ξi). For
the modelling of the utility function, in the literature, it is usually assumed to be concave
(or sub modular in discrete cases) (e.g., Milgrom, 1990); that is, the behaviour of the utility
growth generally follows from the law of decreasing return to scale. We adapt a quadratic
utility function of actions and the state of the task (a, x), that is:
ω(x, a) = µ0 + 2a
′µ(x)− a′Qa, (3.3.1)
where a is a vector of action variables and µ(x) is a vector-valued functions of the state
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of the process on which each member’s action ai is dependent. Moreover, Q is the n × n
interaction matrix, or coordination structure.
In addition to the concavity (we assume Q is positive definite before exploring a general
case), Equation (3.3.1) is a reasonable way to mimic life (Kong, Bhuiyan, & Thomson,
2009): the payoff is better off when more effort is put in (increasing a within some scope),
but worse off when overdone—an effect of decreasing return to scale. The optimal payoff
is, though hard to achieve in reality, believed to exist and located on a moderate exercise of
decisions, i.e. neither too low nor too high. Qualifying these basic conditions as a quadratic
form, Equation (3.3.1) is chosen to be the utility function in our analysis.
3.3.2 Assessment Method
An organizational structure, a set of decision rules, and information determine at least
in part, the utility of an organization. Let ω(α,Q,R) be the utility of coordination structure
Q for a process that is executed through R. Comparisons of various Q and R can then
be based on some evaluation methods of ω, which is called the value of organizational
structure. In this article, we adapt the method suggested in Marschak & Radner (1972),
that is to calculate the maximum expected utility
Ω(Q,R) = max
α
E[ω(R,α1(ξ1), ..., αn(ξn), Q)], (3.3.2)
where E(•) is the expectation function.
The maximum expected utility method provides a relatively fair basis in comparing
among different process and organizational structures. Although for any given R and Q,
the utility could be variable with different decision rules, equation (3.3.2) states that the
utility is evaluated to the organization on the exercise of the best decision rule such that it
maximizes the expected utility function. Without this criterion, comparisons may lead to
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results of unfairness.
The best decision rule maximizes the expectation of the utility function (3.3.1) given the
information ξ, process R, and structure Q. Referring to the person-by-person satisfaction
theorem (Marschak & Radner, 1972), this decision rule is located at the stationary point and
calculated through a set of linear equations derived from taking the first partial derivative
on each decision variables given the available information: each member is searching for
the best decision based on the conditional expectations about actions that might be taken
by others and on the estimation about the state of the design. Without loss of generality,
the unconditional expectation (E(µi), i = 0, ..., n) is set to be zero as relative values (high
vs low), rather than absolute, of the organizational structures are our concern. This also
means that the value of the organizational structure is measured from zero, or the value of





qijE(αj|ξi) = E(µi|ξi) i = 1, ..., n. (3.3.3)
The value of the organizational structure is calculated as the deviation from the null-
information, and since Eµ = 0 and Eα′Qα = Eµ′α, it reduces to:
V (η) = Eαˆµ− (Eα)(Eµ) = Eαˆµ. (3.3.4)
We shall then study R with increased links of information dependence under identical
interaction.
3.3.3 The Value of Organizational Structure in NPD Process
In this section, we study a set of R that represents the processes of NPD. As stated
earlier, the process structure R depends on the level of concurrency. Consider three design
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elements in car development, i.e., 1. engine size, 2. overall shape, and 3. drawing of dies
for car outer panels. An interpersonal information dependence at a low level of concurrency
could be realized as rij = 0 for all i ̸= j except r1,2, r2,1, r2,3, and r3,2, i.e., the information
of 1 and 2, and 2 and 3 are interdependent, respectively. However, parallel development
changes process structure which increases the breadth of information dependence. Die
drawing development may need to estimate the overall shape through the information of
engine size, creating information dependence between 1 and 3.
We assume for simplicity that the number of agents on which one’s information is de-
pendent is identical, and denoted by m ∈ [1, n−1], and correspond to the degree of concur-
rency to coefficient d = m
n−1 . Before exploring a more general process and structure space,
let us consider R is symmetric and with the degree of concurrency d. In addition, the fol-
lowing assumptions hold: (1) µx is normally distributed; (2) self-interaction intensities (qii)
are unified to be 1, whereas interpersonal interaction intensities are assumed to be the same
(qij = q); (3) process is implemented based on adequate communication, and equivalently
information is the best decision rule for each agent ξ = βi, where βi is normally distributed
with zero mean; (4) the covariance matrix of the information is R = cov(ξ) = {rij}, where
rii = σ
2 for all i, and rij = r ≥ 0 for all interdependent i and j ̸= i. These assumptions
will not change the implications drawn from the mathematical models since the overall
differences (q, d, r) are compared.








And by applying the foregoing assumptions, we have:
V = n(σ2 + d(n− 1)rq). (3.3.6)
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Equation (3.3.6) implies that, for each member, the value of the organizational structure
corresponds to a summation of two parts: (1) a reduction of uncertainty as measured by
each individual’s own information variance (σ2); (2) a reduction of uncertainty about peers’
information as measured by the covariance between information. Since each member inter-
acts with d(n− 1) members, this second part is scaled at interaction intensity q. Summing
over n members yields the total value. As a result, the value is increasing with the breadth
of information dependence in R through the degree of concurrency d. Furthermore, the
more rapidly the state of the design changes (the higher the variances and covariances), the
more value the organizational structure is worth. We shall extend the implication drawn
from the results to non-unified interaction intensity q and general process dependence r in
section 3.5.
3.4 Industrial Observations and Model Predictions
In connection to two NPD practices, i.e., sequential and concurrent engineering, this
section compares the model results with industrial observations. As summarized by Kong
et al. (2009), concurrency can be empirically evaluated as level of specialization. Sequen-
tial engineering requires low information dependence that one’s decisions can be made
without an estimation of the others’ following actions (high specialization); however, con-
current engineering leads the information of each team member to be dependent since, in
order to coordinate concurrently, they must estimate peers’ actions and at the same time,
make their own decisions (low specialization). Hence, the first comparison is made between
the following two relationships (Figure 3.1): (1) the value of the organizational structure
(V ) given in Equation (3.3.6) with respect to the degree of concurrency (d); and (2) the
NPD performance (lead time) with respect to the degree of specialization, or concurrency,
as reported by Fujimoto (2000).
Figure 3.1 demonstrates two trends that show the reduction of lead time in comparison
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Figure 3.1: Comparison between (1) model results as Eq. (3.3.6) horizontal axis: degree
of concurrency; vertical axis: the value of organizational structure (solid line: moderate
q, and dashed lines: higher and lower qs) and (2) data reported by Fujimoto (2000) (□),
horizontal axis: specialization; vertical axis: adjusted lead time.
with the increase of the value of the organization. The NPD lead time will be shortened
when more concurrency is applied and that in turn, demands higher level of information
dependence. Our model predicts that the value will increase as d and can even be enhanced
with greater interaction intensity (q). That means higher interaction intensity, or better
coordination, increases the effectiveness of concurrency.
The second comparison is made between the effect of interaction intensity (q) on the
organizational value and the effect of internal integration on lead time as observed by Clark
& Fujimoto (1991). In their study, internal integration is defined as the degree of interaction
among team members in an NPD process, which corresponds to the interaction intensity in
our model. Figure 3.2 shows the comparisons of the empirical data and the model results.
The value linearly increases with the interaction intensity. The three lines indicate condi-
tions under which levels of concurrency (d) are high, moderate, and low, respectively. On
average, the companies in area 1, mostly Japanese companies, exercise a higher extent of
concurrency than that of area 2, i.e., companies from Europe and the U.S.
As a matter of fact, the observed data shows that the NPD performance is positively
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Figure 3.2: Comparison between (1) model results as Eq. (3.3.6) horizontal axis: inter-
action intensity; vertical axis: the value of organizational structure (solid line: moderate
d, and dashed lines: higher and lower ds) and (2) data reported by Fujimoto (2000) (□),
horizontal axis: level of integration; vertical axis: adjusted lead time. Companies in area
one, mostly Japanese, have higher average concurrency than that of area two.
related to the degree of internal integration and concurrency. The modelling results fur-
ther suggest that the two factors are complementary. According to Theorem 2 in Milgrom
(1990), higher breadth of information dependence (higher concurrency) makes each ad-
ditional interaction (higher internal integration) more effective in making better decisions
(shorter lead time), and vice versa (this can be verified with ∂V 2/∂d∂q ≥ 0). In other
words, high concurrency without an appropriate internal integration would impede the pro-
cess performance.
3.5 General Organizational Structure and Process Depen-
dence in Static and Dynamic Environment
This section extends the major implications drawn from Equation (3.3.5) to the analy-
sis of the influence of departmentalization on process performance in static and dynamic
environment.
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The previous sections have shown that the value of the organizational structure in-
creases with interaction intensity (q), and information dependence (r) through concurrency
(d). But in reality, coefficient q differs among members and it is highly dependent on the
department structure. Consider that between every member i and j there is qij as a measure
of their interaction intensity. This q is not required to be the same for every different i and
j. Intra-department interaction is usually more intensive than inter-department interaction.
On the other hand, high interaction intensity incurs more cost, such as communication cost.
Hence, an organization can be viewed as a coordination system with capacity Q at the cost
C.
In addition, an organization solves problems through executing processes that tie orga-
nizational members in another manner. The strength of the ties, as a nature of the process,
is the interpersonal information dependence among members (R). Likewise, depending
on the process, rij usually differs for different members i and j. Given R, the process
dependence, and C, the coordination cost, an organizational design problem is to find an
appropriate organizational structure Q that facilitates process R. Hence, we have:






subject to 0 ≤ qij ≤ 1, for all i ̸= j.
(3.5.1)
In the objective function the positive part is a variation of the value of the organizational
structure in Equation (3.3.6). It is derived from ignoring the parts that are independent on q
and breaking the rest down to the summation of all individual parts (rijqij). In effect, Equa-
tion (3.3.6) can be viewed as an average formulation with its information dependence r to
be interpreted as the average degree of dependence (n(n− 1)rq =∑ni=1∑j∈{1,...n}/i rijq).
Before analyzing how process (R) and cost (C) affect the value of organizational structure
(Q), we describe the spaces in which process R and organizational structure Q vary.
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3.5.1 Process Variation—Exploration and Exploitation
Exploration and exploitation are two approaches in organizational learning (March,
1991). The former often refers to a global search in problem solving whereas the latter
local search (e.g., Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). We interpret
process structure R as solutions to organizational tasks, or problems. Like Zhou (2013)
and Levinthal (1997), we define the complexity of an NPD process as the total number of
non-zero entries in R, except diagonal entries (
∑
i ̸=j sij, sij = 1 if and only if rij ̸= 0).
Figure 3.3 shows a process R with complexity six.
Figure 3.3: A process of six dependence links (complexity six); left: process flow diagram;
right: process dependence matrix
Process structure R varies along two dimensions. The first dimension is an exploration
process through which R takes a series of transition states. At each time period, similar to
the mutation process in the NK model (Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal & Warglien, 1999), there
is, randomly selected, d1 pairs of interpersonal information dependencies to be swapped,
also called rate of change. For example, one period of explorative improvement with d1 = 1
swaps the interdependent pairs between 3 and 4 with 1 and 3 (see Figure 3.4a). Hence,
a persistent improvement along exploration renders process structure R memoryless in
the long run. The structure is eventually capable of escaping from the local optimum.
Organizational adaptation of this approach may be a result of, for example, rapid change of
product family, employment of a new operation process or manufacturing layout, among
other types of explorative efforts.
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Figure 3.4: Examples of one period process variation: a. explorative b. exploitative
Along another dimension,R can respond to the challenge of organizational tasks through
an exploitation process. Different from that of exploration, new process structure inherits,
or memorizes, the complete process structure from old ones. At each time period there is d2
new interpersonal information dependencies to be added in a random manner. For example,
shown in Figure 3.4b, one period of exploitative improvement with d2 = 1 increases the
process complexity by adding interdependent pairs between 1 and 3. Hence, a persistent
improvement along exploitation means a series of local improvement where new solution
is based on an old one, the past information of process structure is preserved in the current.
Evolution of R in this manner may refer to, for example, incremental innovation in NPD
where the development is based on an existing product, refinement of an operation process,
etc.
As per our definition, process variation along exploration discovers new structure with
conserved complexity whereas problem solving by exploitation improves existing solution
with increased complexity. To summarize, we have delineated a two-dimension process
variation space, see Figure 3.5. It is worth noting that we adapt a dynamic representa-
tion. Any point in the space indicates the rate of process change along exploration and
exploitation, and the origin is the static state.
3.5.2 Coordination Structure Variation—Departmentalization
The coordination structure Q, represents the relative interaction intensity of an organi-
zation. In this article, we pay particular attention to the variation of the structure in relation
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Figure 3.5: Dynamic space in exploration and exploitation process variation
to the number of departments. As illustrated in Figure 3.6, Q is a structure where five units
are organized into three departments, i.e., Q1, Q2, and Q3. Each unit has intra-department
interaction intensity q1, and inter-department interaction intensity q2. More agents are able
to freely coordinate with one another in less divisionalized, or more integrated structure,
and vice versa. Hence, fewer departments correspond to a more organic, integrated model,
whereas more departments correspond to a more hierarchical, differentiated model. It is
worth noting that the organizational structure of our consideration involves two parts, the
number of the departments and the assignment of organizational members to the depart-
ments. As a matter of fact, organizational structures may have the same organizational
model, though different assignments.
Figure 3.6: A structure of three department; left: organizational diagram; right: interaction
intensity matrix
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The foregoing framework provides a basis for the analysis of the interplay among or-
ganizational structure Q, process R. Before investigating organization dynamics, we first
study the static condition.
3.5.3 Comparative Performance in Static Environment
We shall construct a set of processes {Ri}, where i is the complexity of the process. In
static and dynamic environments, an exploitative process of seven units (R12) is set as our
base process. The relative process dependencies are uniformly distributed random numbers
(U(0, 1)). New processes with higher complexity are generated by randomly adding more
dependencies among units. Hence, as shown in Figure 3.7, a complete set contains sixteen
processes of different complexity which spans from 12 to 42. Appendix C has complete
process structures R. We further assume that any organizational structure that supports the
processes has intra-department interaction intensity q1, inter-department interaction inten-
sity q2, q1 = 2q2 = 1; the cost of the former is c1, the latter c2. Hence the value of an

















where hij = 1 if the process dependence rij > 0.
Comparisons of Structures
The value of an organizational structure varies with the organizational model, or the
number of departments. Figure 3.8 shows the comparisons of structures of this variation
in three static processes. The comparison is among the best structures with respect to the
value. It takes account of the number of the departments and the assignment of organiza-
tional members to the departments, though the specific assignments are not shown. In the
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Figure 3.7: Seven units processes with different complexity from 12 to 42, Appendix C has
complete process dependence
setting of moderate costs where c1 = 0.4, c2/c1 = 0.25, V (Q,R) is first increasing then
decreasing with the number of departments. We have studied that for all processes in the
given R, this relationship holds irrespective of the complexity. In effect, departmentaliza-
tion resolves a partial complexity of the process by assigning relatively lower interaction
intensity among organizational members of different departments. The loss of the value
due to that lower intensity trades off the opportunity cost of coordination that would have
incurred by high interaction intensity within the department. On the other hand, this loss
finally overtakes the opportunity cost and hence, the value of the organizational structure
decreases as more departments are formed. In short, the size of the organization, or the
number of departments, follows a convex behaviour with the value. However, the optimal
size depends on the coordination costs. In the next section, we study how the number of
departments changes with c1 and c2/c1.
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of the optimal structures with the number of departments in three
processes, R28, R34, R42.
Effectiveness of Organizational Structure and the Costs of Coordination
The best organizational structure balances the gain from reducing communication com-
plexity and the opportunity cost. Its formation depends on this gain and loss through the
exercises of coordination structure. Hence, it is necessary to study how the intra-department
coordination cost (c1) and inter-department coordination cost (c2) impact the formation of
the best structure. Based on process R42, Figure 3.9 illustrates the comparisons of the opti-
mal organizational structures with c1, ratio c2/c1, and value of organizational structure V .
As can be seen, the value corresponding to each optimal structure decreases with the costs,
c1 and c2, respectively. The number of the departments increases with c1 as it gradually di-
visionalizes the structure so as to resolve the growing intra-department coordination com-
plication. On the other hand, this number decreases, ceteris paribus, with c2, or ratio c2/c1,
which is due to the fact that the increasing inter-department coordination cost limits the
divisionalization of the organization, i.e., more departments entail higher inter-department
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cost as c2 raises. Furthermore, simple structures, i.e., less divisionalized, are preferable
to high c2/c1; complex structures, i.e., more divisionalized, in contrast, are preferable to
low c2/c1. It is also worth noting that non-divisionalized structure are the best for small
c1. This usually occurs when the complexity of the process can be resolved by an efficient
coordination method. The very group of the organizational members coordinates according
to the nature of the process, i.e., qij = 1 if rij ̸= 0. Summarizing the above results, we
have shown how the processes’ behaviour, when supported by the optimal organizational
structure, changes as the coordination costs vary. In the cases of different complexity, the
results also hold.
Figure 3.9: Comparisons of the optimal structures with coordination costs on process R42.
Summarizing Results in Static Process Space
We have analyzed the static behaviour of a set of processes under different organiza-
tional structures. The results are intuitive and mostly in line with previous studies perti-
nent to organization size or the degree of divisionalization and coordination burden (e.g.,
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Galbraith, 1977; Gibson et al., 2015; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1999; Zhou, 2013). To illustrate
major implications, we apply the results to a set of NPD processes of different concurrency.
It should be noted that the results hold for general organizational process and structure. As
can be seen in figure 3.10, since a concurrent process demands a higher level of dependency
among members than sequential process, it changes the process structure and intensifies co-
ordination. As the level of concurrency increases, the process becomes more complex and
the costs of interaction raises. We conclude that, for an NPD process with a low level of
concurrency, coordination demand is relatively simple and direct. Process iteration usu-
ally involves fewer organizational members. In this case, simple organizational structure
is preferable. When a higher level of concurrency is introduced, coordination demand is
complex and indirect. Process iteration involves more organizational members. The orga-
nization then needs a divisionalized organizational structure to separate those groups who
are loosely dependent on one another. We also found that, in order to avoid value loss due
to this separation, efficient coordination can be introduced for a high level of concurrency
and as a result, the structure remains stable.
Figure 3.10: Fits between organizational structures and NDP processes as concurrency and
coordination costs change.
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3.5.4 Comparative Performance in Dynamic Environment
This section studies how organizational structure responds to internal change, or con-
tinuous process variation, and to what extent it is stable. We investigate and compare the
behaviour of structures in three special dynamic conditions, i.e., process evolves in ex-
ploitation, in exploration, and in both dimensions. Next, we analyze the opportunity cost
for stabilizing structures in a dynamic environment in relation to organization inertia.
Comparison of the Best Structures with Respect to Exploitative and Explorative Pro-
cesses
Organizational processes are usually developed and continuously improved. The fit-
ness between organizational structure and the processes is key to the performance. We start
with analyzing processes that corresponds to curve 1 in Figure 3.5. Figure 3.11a, and b
illustrate the best structures of two exploitative processes, where ’a’ is calculated through
our base processes R12 to R48 and ’b’ is based on another randomly generated processes
that shares the same initial process with R (R12 = R′12). Both a and b have the rate of
change equal to one along exploitation, meaning one pair of interpersonal information de-
pendence is added for each period. As indicated, the change of the best structure appears
to be relatively sensitive to great process exploitation, insensitive to small process exploita-
tion. It further implies that, although the process performance is mostly contingent on the
organizational structure, structures can have certain degrees of stability. The same structure
could fit multiple processes of similarity. Stated differently, modification of industrial pro-
cesses in an incremental manner does not necessarily alter the effectiveness of the applied
organizational structure. When there is a change in the structural level, the new optimal
structures are continuous improvements of the old ones by transferring members to other
departments. We can see multiple fits as the process complexity rises.
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Additionally, even more stable is the number of the departments, or the model of or-
ganization. Under exploitative dynamics of 16 periods, the organizational model for R
remains unchanged, whereas for R′ it changes only twice through simple movements, i.e.,
splitting one department into two, and merging two departments, respectively. We define
the extend to which organizational model varies as the maximum difference in the num-
ber of departments between each pair of organizational structure. Thus, it is zero in R,
and one in R′ because the structure has experienced maximum reduction, or increase, of
departments from four to three.
Figure 3.11: Variation of the optimal structures in two randomly generated exploitative
processes with rate of change d2 = 1.
Let us now consider an explorative process that corresponds to curve 2 in the dynamic
space (see Figure 3.5). The question that immediately follows is that whether the same
behaviour holds when the process changes in a radical manner for the exploration in a
more complete process space. We study a set of randomly generated explorative processes
with moderate complexity in 16 successive periods (the initial process matrix is R26). Fig-
ure 3.12a shows a simplified representation of the variation in optimal structure. While
the structures still have a certain degree of stability, as indicated by the period under the
circle, the specific assignment changes seem to be more sensitive to continuous process
exploration than exploitation. On the other hand, as indicated by the solid circle, the orga-
nizational model changes three times in 16 periods, which is still stable.
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Similar results can be obtained when the process varies jointly along exploration and
exploitation dimensions with identical rate of change equal to one, see Figure 3.12b (this
corresponds to curve 3 in Figure 3.5). However, increasing in the rate of change in explo-
ration would (curve 4 in Figure 3.5) render the stability property vastly absent, as shown in
Figure 3.12c. Drastic process change destabilizes organizational structure with respect to
maintaining effective fitness. As discussed in the preceding section, one solution is to in-
crease coordination efficiency. The optimal organizational model would then be simpler so
as to reduce the space in which organizational structure varies. One can imagine the occur-
rence of an assignment change will be less frequent in response to process variation under
less rather than more divisionalized structure. As will be discussed in the next section, if
the coordination efficiency is hard to improve, then the optimal organizational structure is
unstable and one has to choose between maintaining old structure while, perhaps, having
suboptimal performance, and maintaining optimal structure while entailing restructuring
cost.
Figure 3.12: Variation of the optimal structures in a. explorative process with d1 = 1; b.
process jointly varies with identical rate of change, d1 = d2 = 1; c. process jointly varies
with d1 = 2d2 = 2.
Thus far, the analysis is only based on a few scattered incidences in dynamic process
space. However, it is important to further study to what extent the results are subject to
the particular incidences, or if it is generally true. The normalized histograms shown in
Figure 3.13 compares the stability in explorative as well as in exploitative process varia-
tion (with d1 = d2 = 1). Each analysis is based on 50 randomly generated incidences
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(having the same initial process with R1 in exploitation and R26 in exploration). While
stability is remarkable in terms of organizational model as well as assignment, structure in
an explorative environment is found to be less stable than in an exploitative environment,
note that the histograms for explorative processes are behind and filled with diagonal lines.
On average, the optimal organizational structure varies 3.78 times with variance 2.95 in
exploitation in contrast to 6.8 with variance 5.39 in exploration, whereas with comparable
magnitude in variance, the organizational model changes 2.96 times in exploitation as com-
pared to 4.6 in exploration. On the other hand, while we understand that the coordination
efficiency is decisive to the form of the optimal organizational model, the analysis further
indicates that process dynamics only fine-tunes the model within the adjacent variation
space. Organizational structures have experienced on average 1.04 maximum departments
addition or removal within 16 variation periods for the exploitative process, and 1.58 for
the exploration process, among all the process incidences.
Figure 3.13: Comparisons of histograms between 50 exploitative and 50 explorative pro-
cess incidences in a. number of structure variation in 16 periods; b. number of organiza-
tional model variation in 16 periods.
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Cost Analysis
The cost for changing the organizational structure depends on the complexity of the
process. Consider a simplified case of an n-department organization with a total of m
agents. Suppose all departments are equal in size and the complexity of a process is s.
Then, with transferring one agent between departments, it can be shown that in relation







). Here the cost is defined by the addition and removal of process dependencies
among departments caused by such a transfer. As simple change in assignment would
be more costly if the process is more complex, or the agent has more interdepartmental
relations. By the calculation, the impact of simple assignment change roughly equals to
0.23s for a seven-person organization of four departments. It raises from 2.8 in R12 to 8.3
in R36. Moreover, one would expect to have a higher cost in changing organizational model
than adjustment of assignment. Hence in our model, structure with process varying along
exploitation is relatively stable, but the cost for structural change increases with complexity.
In other words, early change is more cost-effective than late change. On the other hand,
structure with process varying along exploration is relatively unstable, but the cost for
structural change remains constant as the complexity is conserved. In both directions, the
impact is apparent and it is necessary to analyze an alternative strategy, that is to study the
opportunity cost for maintaining current organizational structure in dynamic environment.
Figure 3.14a demonstrates the opportunity cost of 6 processes in terms of the percentage
of average value at each time period. The deviation between the values when the processes
are executed via a set of optimal structures (always update the structure with time) and
when executed via only one static structure (the optimal structure at period one) is found,
in most cases, to grow rapidly in first few periods, and then stabilize as time elapses. It
finally converges within the level of about 7% to 15% of the average value. This behaviour
is found in explorative as well as exploitative processes with comparable magnitude.
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Figure 3.14: a. growth of opportunity cost with time—illustrated through six process inci-
dences in exploration and exploitation; b. stylized area of stability with level of tolerance
If an organization may be willing to bear a certain percentage of this opportunity cost,
also called the level of tolerance, then stability should be improved. Figure 3.14b offers a
stylized depiction of this relationship based on the dashed curve in Figure 3.14a. We define
stability improvement as the time periods during which the structure of the organization can
remain unchanged while the total opportunity cost is capped at a certain level of tolerance.
Note that this cost is an accumulative value over a time period in a dynamic environment.
The level of tolerance is increasing with increasing increment with stability improvement.
In other words, setting a low level of tolerance is more effective. A 50% tolerance level ren-
ders a stability improvement of about 8 periods. This is quite significant as it corresponds
to roughly 35% of information difference in exploration, or 130% of complexity increase.
Summarizing Results in Dynamic Process Space
The analysis thus far provides a general picture regarding the structural stability and
process dynamics. In short, with or without implementing structure change while an orga-
nization continuously improves its current process matrix depends on the trade-off between
restructuring cost and opportunity cost. If we admit a monotonic relationship between or-
ganizational inertia and age, that older organizations are usually larger and more complex
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than younger ones (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Pe´li, Po´los, & Hannan, 2000), and im-
provements are mostly incremental and therefore exploitative (Sørensen & Stuart, 2000),
then the organizational structure is stable for certain periods of process improvement. An
older organization, first of all, has a good reason to believe that its current structure has the
potential to fit an improved process. Secondly, as the cost for restructuring is proportional
to the complexity of process, it may not be economic for older organizations to invest in
such an effort. They may, otherwise, choose to maintain their current structure. On the
other hand, a younger organization usually has processes of low complexity, and is more
willing to conduct process improvement in exploration (Sørensen & Stuart, 2000). The
structure under this condition is less stable while the cost for restructuring is low and con-
stant. As a result, younger organizations have more incentive to change their organizational
structure than older ones.
An organization also needs to evaluate the opportunity cost. Even though this cost does
not diverge with time periods, it endlessly accumulates until the structure is optimal. Hence,
we can draw from the results that: (1) organizational structure can remain unchanged while
short term, moderate, explorative or exploitative, or both approaches are taken; (2) low
level of tolerance should be used when it takes explorative, or exploitative, or both efforts
in long term and radical processes improvement in order to avoid high costs of structural
adjustments; and (3) restructure without delay, or at least improve the alignment between
process and structure, when major process improvement completes in order to avoid ac-
cumulative opportunity costs. We understand that a more fine-grained analysis requires
additional assumptions in relation to the cost of restructuring; the framework in this section
provides a basis for such study. We shall extend this as part of a future study.
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusions
An organization implements everyday tasks through processes which are coordinated
by organizational structure. We have used a rigorous model, i.e., the maximum expected
payoff method, to study a set of special R and Q. In particular, we model R with vary-
ing level of concurrency in NPD and assume identical interaction intensity matrix. The
results are then extended to R and Q with non-trivial structures, enabling a more practical
analysis in static as well as dynamic environment. The definition of process complexity
resembles the level of dependence in the NK model (Levinthal, 1997), and we relate it to
the exploitative problem solving as the complexity increases with information preserved.
On the other hand, similar to the mutation process in the NK model, R changes its interde-
pendent relations while it conserves the complexity. We relate it to the explorative problem
solving. The dynamic space for process variation is thus based on these two dimensions
of improvement. Compared to configurationalism (Miller, 1986) that suggests few fits be-
tween process and structure, our results in the dynamic process environment demonstrate
the existence of many fits, which supports cartesianism (Donaldson, 2001). Each struc-
ture has a certain degree of stability within a certain period of process changes, forming a
pattern of punctuated equilibrium (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). We have shown that, in
particular with Figure 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12, organizational structures incrementally change
with different assignments as processes vary. In addition to the degree of routinization
(Donaldson, 2006), we argue that the coordination efficiency is also decisive to the forma-
tion of structure. Low coordination costs assist the formation of more organic structures,
and high coordination costs tend to favour the formation of bureaucratic structures.
Although we have studied a set of process movements in the space, i.e., independent,
and joint movements along exploration and exploitation, they represent only limited pro-
cess improvement in practice and a set of others is important. For example, instead of a
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continuous additive effort, an organization may improve its current process via try-and-
error iteration, which can be considered as oscillation in terms of complexity of a certain
degree. An organization may also experience oscillation between exploration and exploita-
tion through temporal separation (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), or simultaneously explore
and exploit through organizational structure separation (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999;
Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009). On the other hand, while the defined
explorative-exploitative space is illustrative, it is by no means complete. It actually re-
stricts process variation in other possible directions such as decomposability (Zhou, 2013).
We shall, in future work, continue exploring the space of process variation.
Supervisory and subordinative relations among organizational members are another im-
portant features. Different from the screening problem (e.g., Swank & Visser, 2008; Visser,
2000), the order of decision processes are not considered in our model. In contrast, by the
nature of complex process where specialists coordinate for less routinized problems, such
as NPD, we take the team approach where the right of decision making is decentralized
among members. Hierarchy, in our model, is simplified as a group of decision makers who
are divisionalized. On the other hand, limited information processing capability (Simon,
1976) and fallible decisions (Sah & Stiglitz, 1985) have impacts on the process perfor-
mance. In future extensions, we shall incorporate these important features of organiza-
tional attributes for a more comprehensive analysis on the interplay between the structure
and process.
Finally, at the model level, we have thus far explored only a partial set of organiza-
tion design attributes whereas a more comprehensive inclusion to the model is possible.
For example, although we assume complete communication, information could be misin-
terpreted and miscommunicated among people (e.g., Galbraith, 1977; Schilling & Fang,
2014; Sparrow, 1999). We can incorporate this feature by introducing a noise term (ε) to
the information ξi(x) = βi + εi. Assume for simplicity that the state of the process and the
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noise are independent of each other, and the noise is normally distributed with mean zero.









j ̸=i var(εi, εj)q
, (3.6.1)
where V is in equation (3.3.5) and V = V ′ in errorless communication. Since the interplay
amongst these error terms can be dependent on the structure of the organization (Schilling
& Fang, 2014), Equation (3.6.1) proposes another line of study that allows analysis of
different hypotheses in terms of how the communication error, in relation to organizational
structure, impact the implementation of process.
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Chapter 4
Team Specialty and Decision-Making
Structures
4.1 Abstract
In the face of changing and uncertain environments, organizational structures are de-
signed and continuously modified. Two important design attributes are decision structure
and information structure. While the former refers to an institution of decision aggregation
in organizational decision-making, the latter is an organizational assignment ensuring deci-
sions meet with appropriate knowledge. We study how the two attributes interact with each
other in a two-dimensional project screening environment where decisions must be made
through evaluating two characteristics of the project. We further investigate the compara-
tive performance of hierarchy and polyarchy in the presence of a set of discrete and contin-
uous information structures, i.e., diverse team specialties. By endogenizing organizational
preference over the two characteristics, the relative merit of hierarchy and polyarchy is not
only dependent on the environment, but on the team composition as well as the organiza-
tional preference. Hierarchy can be better than polyarchy in a “good” environment if the
agents are not equally specialized over the two factors, and vice versa. On the other hand,
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since underestimating bad projects and overestimating good projects are common, increas-
ing knowledge is not always preferable to the overall decision-making effectiveness. This
usually occurs, for example, when the agent’s knowledge on a less organizationally pre-
ferred factor is increased when the environment of a preferred factor is bad. Finally, the
communication between agents should allow the sharing of decision-making in an uncer-
tain environment if the agents exhibit propensity to follow historical decisions. However,
sharing is not always advantageous and we have explored guidelines for the design of or-
ganization in communication channel.
4.2 Introduction
Amongst attributes to organizational success that have long been identified and inves-
tigated, one of the key factors is the information structure referring to the organizational
capability of assigning right agents to appropriate positions. A good assignment means
decisions meet with relevant knowledge ensuring effectiveness at a certain level (e.g., Gal-
braith, 1977; March & Simon, 1993). On the other hand, decision structures such as hi-
erarchy and polyarchy also play a vital role. Individual decisions are organized through
the structures where fallible decisions at an agent level can be aggregated and, to some
extent, rectified at an organization (e.g., Csaszar, 2013; Sah & Stiglitz, 1985). In reality,
decision and information structures are closely related to one another and consequently to
organizational performance.
The two attributes complement one another serving as mechanisms for coordinating ev-
eryday organizational tasks. Although much attention has been paid to address the compar-
ative performance of each structure within an uncertain environment, the interplay between
them has not been adequately addressed; exceptions include Visser (2000) and Csaszar &
Eggers (2013). Formal models mostly evaluate one without fully considering the interac-
tive role of the other, thus limiting the results to be interpreted in a more general context,
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or possibly, incurring the chance of misinterpretation. In this article, we explore the design
of organizational structure by recognizing the fact that agents judge based on multifaceted
information and organizations differ in preference. Specifically, we study information and
decision structures in a two-dimensional project screening environment, and the results
contribute to the existing work with addressing basic problems in areas of organizational
design.
It has been well-known that organizations play a vital role in ensuring that important
decisions are made based on appropriate information (Burton, Obel, & DeSanctis, 2011;
Simon, 1976). But in today’s competitive market environment, decisions usually involve
multiple characteristics that a board of directors has to fully evaluate. For example, a uni-
versity hiring committee may decide to select a new hire based on a candidate’s research
and teaching abilities. Likewise, the success of new product development can rely on its
marketability as well as the difficulty in production. Then the decision on whether or not
to develop the product requires both knowledge from, most likely, marketing analysts and
process engineers. This important role of organization in aligning specific decisions with
relevant information has long been emphasized. Galbraith (1977) studies organizations as
a coordination mechanism for reducing environmental uncertainty and resolving discrep-
ancy. Bavelas (1948), Leavitt (1951), and Guetzkow & Simon (1955) show the relationship
between the performance of a small group and the influence of various communication
patterns. Marschak & Radner (1972) formally state the problem as designing informa-
tion structures. They treat agents who can make decisions that maximize the utility given
limited information, and compare a set of simplified schemes such as centralized versus
decentralized structures.
Simon (1976) views organizations as information processing systems including patterns
of communication and rules for making and implementing decisions. He puts forward the
view of bounded rationality that decision-makers not only have insufficient information,
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but limited cognitive resources to make correct decisions. As a result, fallible decisions
are inevitable and one way to compensate is through organized decision structures (Sah
& Stiglitz, 1985). For example, the role and importance of hierarchy has long been rec-
ognized. The structure serves as a mechanism that facilitates decision-making processes
through aggregating relevant information as well as reducing process complexity (e.g., Cy-
ert & March, 1992; Radner, 1992; Reitzig & Maciejovsky, 2015; Simon, 1996).
On the other hand, a properly organized decision process improves decision-making ef-
fectiveness with respect to omission (rejecting a superior alternative) and commission (ac-
cepting an inferior alternative) errors. Sah & Stiglitz (1986) begin to question the influence
of the process in dichotomous choice situations in a project selection environment. The
contingent nature to the uncertain environment is then studied through different decision
processes. For example, hierarchy outperforms polyarchy in a relatively bad environment,
and vice versa (Sah & Stiglitz, 1986). Koh (1992) extends the problem in an incentive envi-
ronment and then, to a sequential decision-making structure where he argues the fragility of
hierarchy and polyarchy (Koh, 2005). Committee, by sharing the advantages of both hierar-
chy and polyarchy, manifests superiority in reducing both omission and commission errors
(Ioannides, 2012; Sah & Stiglitz, 1988). Koh (1994) and Ben-Yashar & Nitzan (1997) fur-
ther question the optimal decision rule of a fixed-size committee. Csaszar (2014) studies
the size of committee in which agents have non-homogeneous preferences and different
accuracies in decision-making. On top of these stylized structures, more general ones are
recently explored (e.g., Christensen & Knudsen, 2010; Csaszar, 2013; Ioannides, 2012).
Ioannides (2012), by simply composing hierarchy with polyarchy or vice versa, shows one
way to approach a decision structure that is free of omission and commission errors.
Examples such as the processes of new product selection and job recruitment, the en-
vironment on which the decision structures are contingent has multiple dimensions, thus
requiring the organization to be capable of processing heterogeneous information. A few
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studies address this issue. Knudsen & Levinthal (2007) explore the nature of collective
decision-making behaviour through project screening on a rugged landscape. Agents are
exposed and able to process multi-dimensional information. Prat (2002) shows the re-
lationship between the team homogeneity and error reduction. Visser (2000) models a
two dimension-environment in which heterogeneous agents act through hierarchy and pol-
yarchy. Csaszar & Eggers (2013) question how decision policies, as they examining pat-
terns like delegation, unanimity, and averaging, compensates for the cognitive weakness of
specialists facing multiple environmental factors as contrast to generalists.
The literature clearly shows the close relationship that exists among decision processes,
a multi-factor environment faced by the organization, specialties of the team of directors,
and consequently decision-making effectiveness. Yet more knowledge is required to ad-
dress how information structure interacts with the decision process. Furthermore, the effect
of communication between agents on decision-making has been over simplified. Although
it is often assumed that the information transferred is either ”accept” or ”reject”, only few
studies emphasize the effect of historical decisions on the current decision-maker, such
as herd-like behaviour in Swank & Visser (2008). In this study, we compare two types of
communication structures in which an organizer opts to give former decisions to agents and
the latter decision-maker has a tendency to follow the former. In relation to the behaviour
model appearing in Simon (1976), we model boundedly rational agents who have limited
knowledge (like Marschak & Radner (1972)) and insufficient cognitive abilities in their
decision-making (like Sah & Stiglitz (1986)). To keep the analysis tractable, we consider
a problem where the organization faces an environment that varies along two dimensions.
The agents have knowledge about the environment. The every day decision-making is
modelled by a screening process. The performance of the screening is affected by the
information structure, or the specialty of each agent, and the decision processes, namely
hierarchy and polyarchy. Furthermore, along with the agent’s specialty, the nature of over
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and underestimation to a good as well as bad project is analyzed. We pay special attention
to the comparison of information structures when good projects are overestimated, and bad
projects are underestimated.
4.3 Basic Model
The decision structure of an organization exerts influence on the collective organiza-
tional behaviour through an individual’s decision-making process. We adopt for this pro-
cess a project screening task where agents make a dichotomous choice on whether to ac-
cept or reject projects. Agents have bounded rationality with respect to information and
calculation, resulting in fallible decision-making. Limited information about projects as
a result of insufficient knowledge, and erroneous calculation in decision-making as a re-
sult of cognitive and environment limits that all contribute to an inaccurate evaluation of
projects. Moreover, communication also shapes this decision-making process. Whether the
agent knows the decisions from previous evaluations affects her decision-making propen-
sity, such as herd-like behaviour. In the following, we shall start with modelling three
key units of the processes, i.e., the project, the organization, and the evaluator. We then
introduce the decision-making process and finally the communication.
4.3.1 Modelling Attributes—the Project, the Organization, and the
Agent
To describe a typical project screening environment, there are three parties that need to
be characterized, i.e., the project, the organization, and the agent. Suppose a project X has
n factors to be evaluated. It is described by a vector X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) specifying its
intrinsic true value on each factor. Organizations may have distinct preferences over these
n factors of a project. An organization W is described by a vector W = (w1, w2, . . . , wn)
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specifying its weight on each factor. Here we require
∑n
i=1wi = 1 and 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1 for all
i = 1, . . . , n. We model that an organization W obtains value V := V (W,X) =
∑n
i=1wixi
if it accepts the project X , and 0 otherwise. Naturally we assume all evaluators know the
preference W . Throughout this article, the terms value and utility are interchangeable.
The evaluators differ in terms of the knowledge regarding X , and the ability to make
reasonable decisions given the knowledge as we call screening abilities. We characterize
an evaluator E as her knowledge or specialties on n factors (ϵ1, . . . , ϵn) where 0 ≤ ϵi ≤ 1
for every i = 1, . . . , n. In Marschak & Radner (1972), a collection of ϵi for all agents is
known as the information structure of an organization. The screening ability of an agent is
linearly modelled by coefficients a and b. We now explain the meaning of ϵ, a, and b.
4.3.2 Specialties and Decision-Making Process
Consider a set of projects available for evaluation, let X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) denote a
random project, where Xi is the random variable representing the value of the i-th factor
of project X , the expected value of factor i is EXi. We assume the probability distribution
of the value on each factor about the projects is common knowledge among all evaluators.
Hence, given a project X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), the partial description revealed by an agent
(ϵ1, . . . , ϵn) is
yi = EXi + ϵi(xi − EXi), i = 1, ..., n, (4.3.1)
again ϵi measures the knowledge or the specialty, representing the extent to which the
evaluator is able to approach the true information of the project. It is also the extent to which
the evaluator is able to identify the project from the average, or to resolve the uncertainty of
the information regarding the true value. Null information on factor i, that is ϵi = 0, results
in yi = EXi, which implies that a factor is deemed as an average to any evaluator who has
no knowledge on it. This definition allows agents to have basic, or average, knowledge over
projects if ϵ = 0. On the contrary, ϵi = 1 corresponds to an evaluator of full knowledge
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on i, meaning the evaluator is exposed to the complete information of X on factor i. Any
intermediate ϵi derives only partial description about the project on i. In the following
analysis, we call an evaluator E a specialist if she has ϵi → 1 for some, not all, factors,
whereas a generalist if ϵi ̸= 0 for all factors.
Now suppose a project X is received by an organization W , an agent E chooses to





In an ideal situation, evaluators accept a project if VE > 0, reject otherwise. However,
perfect evaluation is hard to achieve. Thus we use a screening function as the proba-
bility of accepting a project p : R → [0, 1]. We consider linear screening behaviour
p(VE, a, b) = aVE + b, where a ≥ 0 meaning the screening is informative. It also rep-
resents the discriminating capability in Sah & Stiglitz (1986), which measures the effec-
tiveness of the decision-making. The evaluator accepts more good projects and rejects more
bad projects, or makes less omission and commission errors, if a is greater. And also the
evaluator is more likely to accept a high utility project than a low one. On the other hand,
intercept 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 is the probability that the evaluator accepts a project when the revealed
utility is zero, or the bias of the agent’s error (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). Higher b also
corresponds to low conservative that agents accept more good as well as bad projects. To
sum up, a single evaluator E working for organization W will accept a project X with
probability p, and reject it with 1− p.
4.3.3 Decision Structure
When two agents are available for an organization, it is important to study the decision
structure or the sequence of decision-making. The decision structure determines among
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three options, whether the organization should accept the project, reject the project, or pass
the project to other evaluators to repeat the screening process. In this article we focus on
hierarchy and polyarchy. A hierarchical structure (H) accepts a project if all evaluators
reach unanimous consent, rejects otherwise, whereas a polyarchy (P) accepts a project if
any one of the two evaluators accepts, rejects if all reject.
4.3.4 Communication Structure
In the literature, a widely assumed communication structure is that the agent has only
the information of projects, or decisions are made independently. We call this the first
communication structure. Although many studies, like Sah & Stiglitz (1986), claim com-
munication comprises dichotomous signals of whether a project is accepted or rejected,
they essentially assume independent decision-making where the previous decisions or the
signals have no effect on the current ones. In effect, under this communication structure
agents are not informed with the decision structure. A double-blind peer review process is
an example of this structure. Reviewers receive manuscripts from editors without knowing
prior review decisions. Following some decision structure, only editors make a collec-
tive judgement based on individual independent decisions. Figure 4.1a depicts a stylized
hierarchical process for this communication structure. Initially, the organization passes a
project to its first agent, and waits for the decision. Evaluator one replies with acceptance
or rejection. Then the organization chooses to repeat the process for the second evaluator
if evaluator one accepts, and evaluator two receives the same information as that of one.
Following this structure, screening behaviour is independent of the previous decision. The
case of polyarchy under this communication structure is similar and thus omitted.
Another structure which we call it the second communication structure where in addi-
tion to the projects, the second agent has the information about the prior decision. In other
words, she knows the decision structure. The screening process under this structure is that
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Figure 4.1: Communication structure: a. independent decision-making hierarchy; b. de-
pendent decision-making polyarchy
after the first round of screening, agent two receives extra information about the decision
of agent one (see Figure 4.1b for a polyarchy). The case of hierarchy under this commu-
nication structure is similar and thus omitted. This extra information exerts effects on the
screening ability. In this article, we mainly consider the effect of herd-like behaviour, and
we have an increasing (decreasing) screening probability if the project is previously ac-
cepted (rejected), which implies that the second agent tends to follow the decision of the
first, i.e., past decision of accepting (rejecting) increases the likelihood of being accepted
(rejected). In the following sections, we shall first analyze the comparative performance
of an organizational structure under the first communication structure, and then extend our
analysis to the second.
4.4 Single Person—Specialist and Generalist
This section discusses the case when an organization dedicates one decision maker to
evaluate projects. The results serve as a basis for subsequent analysis to the two-person
case. We assume that the projects have two factors and the information regarding the
two is distinct and independent. For ease of understanding, we introduce the problem in
the setting of university recruitment where a hiring committee is formed. Consider that a
university is to plan for a new bachelor’s programme. Both research and teaching value are
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important; and professors for this programme will be responsible for lecturing classes as
well as supervising students’ research projects. In order to evaluate applications, a hiring
committee should include professors who are specialists in the area of specialization of
the programme, in teaching and/or research. Now, the university needs to determine based
on its needs in research and teaching (or preference) about who should be the independent
professors to be selected in the committee, how their decisions are aggregated, and whether
or not they communicate the results against each other.
Consider a group of candidates who submit job applications to universities. Each can-
didate demonstrates her ability in terms of two factors, i.e., research (r) and teaching (t),
and suppose the true values are X = (xr, xt). We further assume that any candidate can
be good or bad at teaching and research, respectively. If she is good at i = {r, t}, then
xi = 1, otherwise xi = −1. Furthermore, the portfolio of the applications, or the envi-
ronment, is α = Prob[xr = 1], i.e., the probability that the candidate is a good researcher
(1− α = Prob[xr = −1] a bad researcher). Likewise, β = Prob[xt = 1] is the probability
that the candidate is a good teacher (1− β = Prob[xt = −1] a bad teacher). The variance
Var xr = α(1 − α) characterizes the level of information uncertainty for xr, we see the
information uncertainty is small when α is close to either 0 or 1, on the contrary it is large
when α is close to 1
2
. Similarly Var xt = β(1 − β) is the information uncertainty for xt.
We call an environment neutral if α = β = 1
2
, which corresponds to the environment hav-
ing largest information uncertainties. Moreover, universities have preference over research
and teaching (wr, wt). We can consider wr >> (<<)12 as a research (teaching) oriented
university and wr ≈ 12 as a comprehensive university.
The application is sent to an agent, in our example it refers to an external evaluator,
who has the specialties (ϵr, ϵt). We call a research specialist (R) if ϵr > 0, and ϵt = 0,
a teaching specialist (T ) if ϵr = 0 and ϵt > 0, and finally a generalist (G) if ϵr > 0 and
ϵt > 0. The specialties imply in the example that an experienced professors who can better
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judge a candidate’s value in research and/or teaching to the new programme. Agents then
accept the candidate with probability p(VE) based on the value according to her specialties,
or by definition, VE = wryr + wtyt, where yi is in (4.3.1).
We can now conclude that a university of type (wr, wt) chooses an evaluator whose
information structure is (ϵr, ϵt) and whose screening function is pxr,xt = p(VE(xr, xt), a, b),
will gain expected utility
U = αβp1,1 + (1− α)β(−wr + wt)p−1,1 + α(1− β)(wr − wt)p1,−1 + (1− α)(1− β)(−1)p−1,−1.
(4.4.1)
It can be simplified as a summation of two parts, i.e., the expected utility with and without
information,
U = VI + V0, (4.4.2)
where
VI(ϵr, ϵt) = 4aϵrw
2
rα(1− α) + 4aϵtw2t β(1− β), (4.4.3)
and
V0 = a(2wrα + 2wtβ − 1)2 + b(2wrα + 2wtβ − 1). (4.4.4)
As per Marschak & Radner (1972), VI is called the value of information structure as com-
pared with null information structure. Let UR, UT and UG denote the expected utility when
an evaluator of type R, T and G is chosen, respectively. The properties of U is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4.1. 1 Part A. The expected utility is increasing with ϵr and ϵt (∂U∂ϵi ≥ 0, i =
r, t); it is increasing in a (∂U
∂a
≥ 0). The value of information structure is increasing with
the information uncertainty ( ∂VI
∂Varxi
≥ 0, i = r, t).






, such that UR > UT if
1All proofs, except for obvious ones, are in Appendix D
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and only if wr > w0; ∂w
0
∂Varxt
≥ 0 and ∂w0
∂Varxr
≤ 0.
Part C. Consider the cost for agent E ∈ {R, T,G} is CE . In a neutral environment, if
either one of the following conditions is satisfied, (1) ϵr, ϵt, a are the same for R, T , and G,
and CR + aϵrϵt(√ϵr+√ϵt)2 > CG > CR = CT ; (2) aϵr and aϵt are greater in R, T than is in G






, and CG = CR = CT , ceteris paribus; then there
exists two positive numbers, 1 > w+ > w− > 0, such that the agent that maximizes the
utility is R if wr > w+, G if w+ > wr > w−, and T if wr < w−.
If ϵr, ϵt, a, b and C are the same for R, T and G, then UG ≥ UT and UG ≥ UR for all
wr.
Proposition 4.4.1 is intuitive and it implies that a university usually benefits more from
dedicating an evaluator with more knowledge (ϵ) and better judgement (a). Complementar-
ily, the benefit of knowledge is evaluated in the presence of uncertain environment (Var x).
In this single-agent decision process, uncertainty renders knowledgable agents with good
judgement more valuable to the university. And between two specialists R and T , the more
uncertain the environment, the higher the need for the university to dedicate a specialist
who can observe the environment (Part B).
It is also intuitive that the generalist outperforms, regardless of the types of the uni-
versity, over the two specialists when she is as good as the specialists and does not cost
more (see G′ in Fig 4.2). However, it is of practical importance to study condition (1) and
(2) in proposition 4.4.1 in which the generalist costs more to have more specialties, or the
generalist is less knowledgable than the specialists with the same cost. In either condi-
tion, all types of the universities are divided into three categories where the comparative
performance is very obvious (see the thick line in Fig 4.2).
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Figure 4.2: Comparative performance with university type and evaluator.
4.5 Team Structures
We extend the single person screening problem to the case when an organization ded-
icates a team. In this section, a two-person team is considered and the decision structures
are hierarchy and polyarchy. We shall study the comparative performance of organizational
structures, and then analyze the behaviour of the decision-making process. For conciseness,
we denote a two-person information structure by E1 − E2 where E ∈ {R, T,G}.
4.5.1 The Value of Organizational Structures
Let us first consider a university of type W = (wr, wt) dedicating a hierarchical team
with information structure (ϵri , ϵti) and screening function pi(Vi, ai, bi), i = 1, 2. Following
the assumptions made in the preceding section, the expected utility under environment
(α, β) is the summation of two parts, i.e., the expected utility with and without knowledge,
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V HI = 4a1ϵr1α(1− α)w2r(a2(2αwr + 2βwt − 1) + b2) (4.5.2)
+4a2ϵr2α(1− α)w2r(a1(2αwr + 2βwt − 1) + b1)
+4a1ϵt1β(1− β)w2t (a2(2αwr + 2βwt − 1) + b2)
+4a2ϵt2β(1− β)w2t (a1(2αwr + 2βwt − 1) + b1)
+4a1a2ϵr1ϵr2w
2
rα(1− α)(wr − wt − α + β + (wt − wr)(α + β))
+4a1a2ϵt1ϵt2w
2
t β(1− β)(wt − wr − β + α + (wr − wt)(α + β)),
and
V H0 = (a1(2wrα+2wtβ−1)+b1)(a2(2wrα+2wtβ−1)+b2)(2wrα+2wtβ−1). (4.5.3)
Similarly, the utility under polyarchy is





V PI = 4a1ϵr1α(1− α)w2r(a2(−2αwr − 2βwt + 1) + 1− b2) (4.5.5)
+4a2ϵr2α(1− α)w2r(a1(−2αwr − 2βwt + 1) + 1− b1)
+4a1ϵt1β(1− β)w2t (a2(−2αwr − 2βwt + 1) + 1− b2)
+4a2ϵt2β(1− β)w2t (a1(−2αwr − 2βwt + 1) + 1− b1)
+4a1a2ϵr1ϵr2α(1− α)w2r(−wr + wt + α− β + (−wt + wr)(α + β))
+4a1a2ϵt1ϵt2β(1− β)w2t (−wt + wr + β − α + (−wr + wt)(α + β)),
and
V P0 = (1−(1−(a1(2wrα+2wtβ−1)+b1))(1−(a2(2wrα+2wtβ−1)+b2)))(2wrα+2wtβ−1).
(4.5.6)
4.5.2 Behaviour of Hierarchy and Polyarchy Under Neutral Environ-
ment
It is of particular interest to first consider the neutral environment (or equivalently the
environment with maximum uncertainty). Let us assume identical screening ability (p1 =
p2 = p(a, b)). Then the utility for decision structures j ∈ {H,P} is












b, if j = H,
1− b, if j = P .
(4.5.8)
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Note that V j0 = 0 and proposition 4.5.1 states the properties of U
j when agents (ϵ) and
preference W are fixed.
Proposition 4.5.1. UH = UP if b = 1
2
, UH > (<)UP if b > (<)1
2
.
In a neutral environment, a hierarchy is equivalent to a polyarchy if the evaluator is
equally likely to accept and reject candidates with zero value. In other words, the screen-
ing property has moderate slack, or risk-neutral (b = 1
2
). Recall Sah & Stiglitz (1986),
under this special condition, hierarchy is as good as polyarchy, and the decision structures
are indifferent to the final screening result. Although it is known that hierarchy rejects
more good projects (makes more omission errors) and polyarchy accepts more bad projects
(makes more commission errors), the negative impacts due to the two types of errors can-
cels out for each structures. Proposition 4.5.1 also identifies the conditions under which
one structure outperforms the other. The results are intuitive. If the screening behaviour
of the evaluator is globally more slack, i.e., b > 1
2
, meaning one at the same time accepts
more good and bad projects which compensates the weakness of hierarchy, then it is better




Consider the effect of information structure on the screening behaviour. We further
assume the total specialties
∑
i=1,2(ϵri + ϵti) are the same in teams of specialists, i.e.,
R − R, T − T , and R − T . We use superscript to indicate the information structure.
For example, {ϵR−Gri , ϵR−Gti }i=1,2 is the knowledge representation for a team formed with a
research specialist and a generalist. Proposition 4.5.2 below summarizes the comparison
made amongst information structures.
Proposition 4.5.2. Part A. If the following condition is satisfied, (1) {ϵri}i=1,2 and {ϵti}i=1,2
in G − G are the same as in R − R and T − T , respectively, and CR−R + ab(ϵt1+ϵt2 )4 >
CG−G > cR−R = CT−T ; or (2) CG−G = CR−R = CT−T , but (ϵr1 + ϵr2) is less in G − G
than in R−R, and (ϵt1 + ϵt2) is less in G−G than in T − T , then there exists two positive
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numbers, 1 > w+ > w− > 0, such that the structure that maximizes the utility is R − R if
wr > w
+, G−G if w+ > wr > w−, and T − T if wr < w−.
Part B. If the following condition is satisfied, (1) generalist is as knowledgable as
specialists in terms of research and teaching, and CG−G − CT−G > CT−G − CT−T ,
CG−G − CR−G > CR−G − CR−R; or (2) the costs for all structures are equal, but
(ϵT−Gt1 + ϵ
T−G
























)− (ϵR−Gr1 + ϵR−Gr2 )
(4.5.10)
then there exists four positive numbers, 1 > w4 > w3 > 1
2
> w2 > w1 > 0, such that the
structure that maximizes the utility is T − G if w1 < wr < w2, R − G if w3 < wr < w4
(Figure 4.3).
It is not surprising that in the neutral environment, agents’ specialties should fit to
organizational preference. Homogeneous team of specialists, like R−R or T −T , is better
off for non-comprehensive university that has a strong preference in research or teaching.
As the weights tends to be balanced, non-homogeneous team, like G − T , G − R, or
sometimes G−G depending on the relative costs, outpaces and responds to different level
of needs in uncertainty resolution, see Figure 4.3 for a stylized depiction.
4.5.3 Hierarchy or Polyarchy—Given Information Structure with Gen-
eral Environment
This section discusses the relative merits of the two decision structures when the infor-
mation structure of the organization is given. It is well-known that hierarchy has advantages
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Figure 4.3: Comparisons of information structures in a neutral environment
in a bad environment whereas polyarchy in good (bad environment is defined as the prob-
ability that the project is good is less than 1
2
). We shall show, when the environment has
two dimensions, it is subject to the organizational preference and the composition of the
decision-making team.
Consider the case when a university is limited to using existing agents, i.e., the infor-
mation structure is given as η ∈ E × E, and it is viable to change the decision structure,
then the utility difference of the two structures is
∆ = (UH − Up)|η,wr,α,β. (4.5.11)
The sign of ∆ implies the relative severity of making the two types of errors in hierar-
chy versus polyarchy, when agents (E1 and E2), environment (α and β), and type of the
university (wr and wt) are given. A line on which ∆ = 0 is called indifference line.
Let E1 −E2 be an information structure, we call this structure symmetric if ϵr1 + ϵr2 =
ϵt1 + ϵt2 , that is, knowledge in research and teaching are balanced. Assume for simplicity
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identical screening ability and a = b = 1
2
. The results for symmetric information structures
are summarized in Figure 4.4a. Horizontal line {l1 : β = 0.5} on which ∆ = 0 for a
pure teaching university (wr = 0) divides the environment space into two parts. Because
the research ability adds no value to the university, the sign of ∆ is independent on α.
As a result, when there are less good teachers (β < 0.5), hierarchy is better, otherwise
polayarchy is better. The indifference line changes as wr increases, or wt decreases, see
line l2 in Figure 4.4a. The university in this scenario starts to have preference in the research
ability of the candidates which renders l2 dependent on α. We find that hierarchy turns out
to be better than polyarchy in area ABO, which is inside the region of good teaching and bad
research environment, i.e., rectangle AOEC. Furthermore, this area grows as the university
weighs more heavily on the research ability of the candidates. Hierarchy becomes more
effective when the bad research environment has increasing importance to the university.
On the other hand, when good environment (α > 0.5) has increasing importance (wr ↑) to
the university, polyarchy becomes more effective, see area GIO. Diagonal line {l3 : β =
1 − α} is the solution to ∆ = 0 at wr = 0.5. The university in this scenario has equal
preference in research and teaching, and should choose hierarchy if α + β < 1, polyarchy
if α+β > 1. As the importance on research (teaching) continuously increases (decreases),
area CDO is taken by hierarchy, and area JKO by polyarchy. Eventually when wr = 1, or a
pure research university, we see the whole area ACEO is under hierarchy and GJLO under
polyarchy.
We observe similar behaviour as wr increases for non-symmetric information struc-
tures, namely, ϵr1 + ϵr2 ̸= ϵt1 + ϵt2 in R − R, T − T,R − G, and T − G. As can be
seen in Figure 4.4b, hierarchy is better than polyarchy for a pure teaching university in
rectangle AGIM (β < 0.5). As wr increases from 0 to 1, the area for hierarchy changes to
rectangle BELM (α < 0.5). Solid curve BDOKI and dashed curve BCOJI are two indiffer-
ence lines at wr = 0.5. The former characterizes the behaviour of a research rich structure
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Figure 4.4: Relative merits of hierarchy versus polyarchy in two-dimensional environment
with various organizational preference
(R−R,R−G), the latter a teaching rich structure (T−T, T−G). In contrast to the symmet-
ric information structures where the indifference line is BI, area BDO has a higher value in
a good teaching environment (β). However, a research rich structure has less knowledge in
teaching. Therefore, in the bad research environment, the slight improvement in teaching
environment does not sufficiently compensate the loss due to commission errors caused by
polyarchy, nor does it ultimately let polyarchy outperform hierarchy. Likewise, in a good
research environment, a slight decrease in research environment does not let hierarchy out-
perform polyarchy, see area IKO. As a result, a sigmoid indifference curve is so formed.
On the opposite side, the same reasoning follows for the teaching rich structures, see area
BCO and IJO.
In general, hierarchy should be chosen if the environment in which the type of the
university depend is relatively bad, otherwise polyarchy is more effective. Furthermore,
insufficient knowledge would render hierarchy to dominate polyarchy even if the environ-
ment is slightly better than the threshold to which structure of polyarchy would have been
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better under symmetric information structures. On the other hand, it would render pol-
yarchy to dominate hierarchy when the environment is slightly worse than the threshold.
For example, line BI is the threshold at wr = 0.5 in symmetric case.
4.5.4 Information Structures—Given Decision Structure with Gen-
eral Environment
If one considers the state or the economic systems of a country or the decision structure
of a mature company, these are sometimes tremendously difficult to change. Therefore,
changing the information structure becomes an important solution for performance im-
provement in the face of a changeable environment. This section starts with exploring
the effect of team homogeneity on the screening performance through a continuous repre-
sentation of the information structure, and then it compares a set of discrete information
structures of interest.
Continuous Information Structures
The proposition below summarizes the behaviour of a continuous information structure
in a general environment. We assume identical agents E1 = E2 and a = b = 0.5.
Proposition 4.5.3. Part A. The first-order derivatives of the utility s1 := ∂U∂ϵr and s2 :=
∂U
∂ϵt
have the following properties.
(1) In a hierarchy, if ϵr ≥ 2β1−2β and β ≤ 14 , then there exists w′ ≥ 12 such that s1 ≤ 0 if and
only if wt ≥ w′. And symmetrically, if ϵt ≥ 2α1−2α and α ≤ 14 , then there exists w′ ≥ 12 such
that s2 ≤ 0 if and only if wr ≥ w′.
(2) In polyarchy, if ϵr ≥ 2β−21−2β and β ≥ 34 , then there exists w′ ≥ 12 such that s1 ≤ 0 if and
only if wt ≥ w′. And symmetrically, ϵt ≥ 2α−21−2α and α ≥ 34 , then there exists w′ ≥ 12 such
that s2 ≤ 0 if and only if wr ≥ w′.
(3) In both hierarchy and polyarhcy, if wr ≥ (≤)12 , then s1 ≥ 0 (s2 ≥ 0).
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(4) If β = 0 or 1, α ∈ (0, 1) and wr ∈ (0, 1), then s1 > s2 in H as well as in P .
Symmetrically, if α = 0 or 1, β ∈ (0, 1) and wr ∈ (0, 1), then s1 < s2 in H as well as in P .






) is a concave




s3 dα = 0 (
∫ 1
0
s4 dβ = 0), and if wr ≥ (≤)12 , s3|α=0 ≥ 0, s3|α=1 ≤ 0
(s4|β=0 ≥ 0, s4|β=1 ≤ 0).
Part C. The second-order derivative of the utility s5 : ∂U
2
∂ϵt∂α





(1) s5 and s6 are positive in hierarchy, negative in polyarchy.
(2) s5 (s6) is proportional to the information variance in teaching (research).
(3) For wr ≥ 12 (wt ≥ 12 ), s5 (s6) is decreasing with wr (wt) in hierarchy, increasing in
polyarchy.
Part D. For wr ≥ (≤)12 , if ϵr ≥ (≤)ϵt, then s3− s5 (s4− s6) is positive in bad research
(teaching) environment, negative in good.
We have verified that an increase in specialties improves the utility in a single-person
setting (proposition 4.4.1). However, a rather non-intuitive result is that in a two-person
team, there exists conditions in which the decision structures negates this effect. Proposi-
tion 4.5.3 part A implies that in a teaching oriented university where the teaching environ-
ment is bad (good), improving research knowledge does not guarantee a globally improved
hierarchy (polyarchy) performance. Here for conciseness, we do not restate the implica-
tion regarding the symmetric factor, i.e., research. This nonintuitive result is attributed to
the fact that if the decision made by agents is a right one, accepting a good project or re-
jecting a bad project, or a wrong one, accepting a bad project or rejecting a good project,
incomplete knowledge brings about imperfect evaluation that deviates from the true value
from two directions, i.e., overestimating and underestimating the project. And a project is
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more likely to be accepted if it is over rather than underestimated. Hence, more knowl-
edge would change the global utility through a net effect. It brings benefit if a bad project
was overestimated, or a good project was underestimated before knowledge increase, and
it causes loss if a bad project was underestimated, or a good project was overestimated.
Although in single agent, or single factor environment, this net effect is always positive,
meaning more knowledge is better to the organization, it can be negative in a multi-factor
environment as we show in proposition 4.4.1 part A. The decision structure, organizational
preference, and the projects portfolio determine the conditions in which knowledge im-
pedes performance. We use a numerical example to illustrate the conditions in hierarchy
and conditions of polyarchy are symmetric in terms of organizational preference as well as
projects portfolio.
A research oriented university, wr = 0.9, wt = 0.1, selects candidates from a portfolio
α = 0.1, β = 0.5; we study the utility difference when a hierarchically organized team with
identical agents a = b = 0.5 changes its individual teaching knowledge from 0.5 to 1, while
the research knowledge equals 1 and remains unchanged. The impact of this knowledge
improvement breaking down to each type of candidates is summarized in Table 4.1. We use
G and B to mean good and bad, respectively. The estimation and the accepting probability
at agent level vary in a conserved manner, i.e., the difference before and after knowledge
improvement adds up to zero. As we know from proposition 4.4.1, the utility is always
increasing with knowledge in the single agent case. However, individual changes give rise
to nonlinear changes in hierarchy. The probability that a candidate is accepted equals q2,
or the rate of change is proportional to p and a higher p brings about more impacts. In the
example, the selected condition led the negative effect to dominate and finally the utility
decreases.
Part A also implies that a university should dedicate an agent with more knowledge
to which it is preferred. In a research (teaching) oriented university, evaluators with high
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Table 4.1: Utility calculation breakdown: comparison between before and after knowledge
improvement.
Candidate type Portfolio
Before knowledge improvement (difference after improvement)
Agent Estimation Agent Prob. Hierarchy Prob. Utility
Gr Gt 0.05 0.95(+0.05) Under. 0.975(+0.025) 0.951(+0.049) 0.047(+2.47E− 3)
Gr Bt 0.05 0.85(−0.05) Over. 0.925(−0.025) 0.856(−0.046) 0.034(−1.82E− 3)
Br Gt 0.45 −0.85(+0.05) Under. 0.075(+0.025) 0.006(+0.004) −2.03E− 3(−1.57E− 3)
Br Bt 0.45 −0.95(−0.05) Over. 0.025(−0.025) 6.25E− 4(−6.25E− 4) −2.81E− 4(+2.81E− 4)
Sum 0.079(−6.5E− 4)
research (teaching) knowledge is always helpful. In addition, when organizations face
limited resources, we find, in hierarchy, that increasing teaching (research) knowledge is
more efficient for a university in a certain research (teaching) environment, either good or
bad. Hence in short, regardless of the decision structure, one should increase the knowledge
in one dimension if the opposite one is stable.
Parts B, C, and D consider a dynamic environment in which the information α and β
vary with time. When the environment in research (teaching) gets better, the marginal util-
ity of a research (teaching) oriented university is first increasing then decreasing in research
(teaching) knowledge. This behaviour is due to the change of environment uncertainty. As
a result, increases in knowledge becomes more (less) efficient when the environment un-
certainty increase (decrease).
On the other hand, part C summarizes, regarding the behaviour of interactive terms α
with ϵt and β with ϵr, that the marginal utility of a hierarchy is increasing in research (teach-
ing) knowledge as the teaching (research) environment gets better, whereas the marginal
utility of a polyarchy is decreasing in research (teaching) as the teaching (research) envi-
ronment gets better. In other words, when the teaching (research) environment gets better,
it is more efficient to increase research (teaching) knowledge in hierarchy than polyarchy.
Under the same condition, part C also implies that it is more preferable, in hierarchy than
polyarchy, to increase research (teaching) knowledge under high than low research (teach-
ing) uncertainty, and in comprehensive than specialized university.
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Finally, part D compares the marginal utility in research and teaching as the environ-
ment varies and the result is intuitive. It suggests that if ϵr ≥ (≤)ϵt, then in dynamic
environment a research (teaching) oriented university should always prefer to increase re-
search (teaching) knowledge in bad research (teaching) environment, and increase teaching
(research) knowledge in good. This holds for both hierarchy and polyarchy.
Discrete Information Structures
This section analyzes discrete information structures η. By equation (4.5.1) and (4.5.4),
the information structure that maximizes the utility is
η¯i = argmax
η
{U iη|η ∈ E × E}wr,α,β, i = H,P. (4.5.12)
We further assume that all information structures have the same costs, while specialists
have equal knowledge in research or teaching (ϵ = 0.8). Generalists have equal, but less
than that of specialists, knowledge in research and teaching (ϵ = 0.5).
Figure 4.5 summarizes the numerical results in hierarchy and polyarchy. As can be
seen, the performance of the information structures mainly depends on the type of univer-
sity and the uncertainty of the environment. In a comprehensive university, the team of
centralized generalists (G−G) is, among all the information structures, the best in the en-
vironment where the uncertainty of both research and teaching are moderate to high. If the
university has preference in research, a team of centralized research specialists (R − R) is
the best in the environment where the uncertainty of research is moderate to high. Likewise,
team of centralized teaching specialists (T−T ) is the best for a teaching oriented university
in the environment where the uncertainty of teaching is moderate to high. Moreover, re-
gardless of the type and the decision structure, university exposed to low uncertainty in one
factor demands less knowledge requirement to the agents while the uncertainty in the other
factor starts to play a part. For example, in addition to teaching knowledge, for a teaching
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oriented university under hierarchy, information structures with research knowledge com-
ponent like R− T,G−G, T −G become the best team when the environment of teaching
is bad, and structures like G − G,R − G,R − R becomes the best when the environment
of teaching is good (see Figure 4.5 a1). Furthermore, as α increases, the knowledge of
research in the best team first increases then decreases, which is a similar result comparing
to the continuous case (proposition 4.5.3 Part B). On the other hand, the teams generally
have higher research knowledge in a good teaching environment than bad in hierarchy. The
opposite is true in polyarchy, see the continuous case in proposition 4.5.3 Part C. The im-
plications for a research oriented university are symmetric (see a3 and b3 in Figure 4.5),
and we do not restate.
Figure 4.5: Comparison of information structures in a general environment
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4.5.5 Summarizing Results
In the most general case, the variable space of an organizational structure, denoted ζ ,




{U iζ |ζ ∈ {E × E} × {H,P}}wr,α,β. (4.5.13)
This equation can be considered as the superposition of the results derived in the preced-
ing two sections. In Figure 4.6, hierarchy and polyarchy are equally separated by dashed
indifference lines that depend on the type of the university (equation (4.5.11)). In general,
polyarchy is more preferable than hierarchy when the environment is better, i.e., to the
right of the line, and vice versa. Like the effectiveness of decision structure relays on the
environment quality, that of information structure is more sensitive to the environment un-
certainty. The results in section 4.5.3 and proposition 4.5.3 provide a general guideline on
how to structure a decision-making team by considering the interactive relationship of deci-
sion process and information structure. Mainly, the decision process serves as an important
means to reduce omission and commission errors while the basis of decision-making is
the specialties of the agents. We have shown that the important influence an asymmetric
information structure exerts on the performance of hierarchy and polyarchy. On the other
hand, there exist inevitable errors that are due to over and underestimating a project, fur-
ther complicating the decision-making nature. We have identified conditions under which
an appropriate level of specialty complements decision structures in a changeable environ-
ment.
4.6 The Alternative Communication Structure
Finally, we consider the second communication structure that the evaluator knows the
previous decision about the candidate. Assuming the second evaluator is prone to follow the
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of discrete organizational structures in general environment
decision received, we shall analyze the comparative performance of the two communication
structures. Formally, we have the screening behaviour for the second evaluator
p2 = p(VE, a, b) + z (4.6.1)
where z = µ > 0 if the project is accepted,−µ otherwise. We also assume identical agents,
ϵ = ϵr = ϵt and a < 0.5, b = 0.5.
Proposition 4.6.1. Part A. There exists
1
2
≥ c = 4a− 4ϵa− 1 +
√
16ϵ2a2 − 16ϵa2 + 1
8a− 8ϵa , (4.6.2)
such that for pure research university, if α < (≥)c, then ∂UH
∂z




> (≤)0. For pure teaching university, if β < (≥)c, then ∂UH
∂z
< (≥)0, and if
β < (≥)1− c, then ∂UP
∂z
> (≤)0.
Part B. For comprehensive university (wr = 0.5), there exists cH , cP , such that if β <
(≥)cH , then ∂UH
∂z
< (≥)0. And if β < (≥)cP , then ∂UP
∂z
> (≤)0. Along the diagonal






= 2aϵα(1− α) ≥ 0. (4.6.3)
Part C. c, −(1− c), cH , and −cP is decreasing with ϵ.
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The second agent is informed with an acceptance in hierarchy and rejection in pol-
yarchy. Essentially, the second communication structure led the later agent to more slack
in hierarchy and less slack in polyarchy, an offset for the downsides of the decision struc-
tures. It renders hierarchy more risk-seeking while polyarchy more risk-averse. Firgure 4.7
depicts a stylized comparison in which the second communication structure is better, in-
dicated by the arrows. Results of pure teaching and research universities are symmetric:
pure teaching university values only the teaching quality about the candidate. Hence, hi-
erarchy exposed to a moderate to good teaching environment and polyarchy to a moderate
to bad teaching environment benefits more from using the second communication structure
(part A). When the university starts to have preference in research, the condition changes
following similar pattern as that of indifference line in (4.5.11). For example, polyarchy
dominates hierarchy above diagonal line AB in a comprehensive university (wr = 0.5).
The university could even benefit more in area ABC when decisions are shared.
Figure 4.7: Relative merits of the first and second communication structures in pure re-
search, pure teaching, and comprehensive university; the arrows indicate areas in which
the second communication structure is better.
We can also interpret the results as an extension to (4.5.11) (Figure 4.4). Knowledge
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ϵ > 0 and herd-like behaviour cause the original indifference line splitting into two, thus
generating areas in which the second communication structure is always beneficial, like
ACBD. This effect can be generalized. Regardless of the preference, high uncertainty
in both research and teaching environments encourages the sharing of decisions, see area
E. In short, the second communication structure is always advantageous in an uncertain
environment if the decision shared is not pure guessing. However, when agents have no
knowledge ϵ = 0, the conditions degrades to that of indifference lines in (4.5.11).
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
The state of a project environment that comprises of two characteristics has been the
primary determinant to the performance of organizational decision structures. Our study
shows that this is not sufficient. By merely taking account of the environment might result
in achieving sub-optimal performance. The team specialties, or the information structure,
matter. We have investigated the relationship between decision and information structures
in a two-dimensional environment where organizations differ in preference. The results
confirm with the existing literature the essential role of the two attributes in general, and
identify conditions under which one structure interacts with another affecting the decision-
making effectiveness, specifically.
Hierarchy and polyarchy exhibit relative merits over one another subject to the orga-
nizational preference over the state of the two-dimensional environment. Furthermore, a
team of unbalanced knowledge would impact the effectiveness of decision structure. For
example, even the research environment is not good enough to let polyarchy outperform
hierarchy, a team with more research knowledge than teaching would compensate the de-
ficiency of polyarchy in making commission errors and consequently, one should consider
adopting polyarchy for that team. In addition, we have studied how to form a team while
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the decision structure is predetermined. Because overestimating a good project and under-
estimating a bad could be beneficial, performance is not simply improvable by knowledge
increase. We identify conditions under which knowing less is better. This especially oc-
curs, for instance, when a hierarchy (polyarchy) increases its specialty in, say research,
while what is preferred to the organization is teaching and more than half of the candidates
in the portfolio are (not) bad at teaching. Finally, we extend our basic model to incorpo-
rate extra information about historical decisions, i.e., the second communication structure.
We question if one should let the decision-makers be informed with the decision structure,
hierarchy or polyarchy, or should the screening results be communicated. On top of a set
of explicit conditions, we conclude that sharing decisions between agents is always bene-
ficial when information uncertainty in both environmental dimensions are high, and agents
exhibit herd-like behaviour.
Although the analysis has been based on an example in university recruitment for
launching a new specialized programme, the results could directly apply to firms in the
following situation. An organization is to select good projects which have two important
features, say A and B. Not everyone has a good knowledge on both A and B. Hence in
order to select, the organization needs to put right person in a screening process. At the
same time, due to the fundamentally limited resource and organizational diversity, it is
common that different organizations who face the same group of projects differ in pref-
erence. For example, organization 1 could favor feature A whereas organization 2’s sale
relies more on its strength in feature B. Our results imply the directions for improvement in
decision-making effectiveness through organizational changes in decision structure, team
specialties, and communication structure.
At least three lines of immediate extensions are possible. The first one is along a deeper
exploration of the behaviour of the agent. Puranam et al. (2015) summarizes that besides
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the important role of a decision process in aggregating individual decisions that are imper-
fect because of bounded rationality, decision-making effectiveness can be improved with
experience, see Csaszar (2014) for such a model. We shall incorporate this nature of in-
dividual learning in analyzing the comparative utility between decision structures. The
second is along an extension of decision structures by including a general set of structures
(Christensen & Knudsen, 2002). Hierarchy and polyarchy are simple and special cases
in project screening; a more comprehensive view with respect to how information struc-
ture interacts with decision structures is needed in practice. General structures have been
summarized and studied, (e.g., Csaszar, 2013; Ioannides, 2012); but these are not complete.
For example, structures like ones that involve decision loops are practically important while
inadequately studied. Hence, we shall extend our current study in exploring a more gen-
eral decision structure space. Lastly, the assumptions regarding the information conveyed
between decision-makers can be further modified to study the manner in which a commu-
nication structure influences the decision-making effectiveness. Projects can be evaluated
beyond the dichotomous choice that we have explored. For example, a percentage scale is
usually adopted in practice. Agents would now face, instead of a straightforward decision
from previous agents, such as an acceptance or rejection, a rate which is a continuous vari-
able. Hence, we will extend the model by considering the effect of transmitting continuous
information about the projects on the performance of the decision-making structures.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Contributions and Future
Work
5.1 Summary of Conclusions
Organizational problems confronted by managers who need to strategically make de-
cisions, involve analyzing complex environments. The decisions can span, for example,
from a lower level of determining the start time of a process to a higher level of evaluat-
ing the present fitness between organizational structure and processes. We have devoted
much of our attention to three specific levels of organizational research. The overlapping
NPD processes analysis provides a framework for estimating the lead time through the
dependence between up and downstream processes, and in turn, supporting managers on
choosing among a set of strategies. Under the conditions of incremental innovation, this
dependency is linked to the evolutionary behaviour of downstream so that the magnitude
of rework can be evaluated. Based on that, decision-making for the managers on the se-
lection of overlapping strategies can be improved. When different overlapping strategies
are applied, the model provides information on how the performance varies in terms of
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lead time, total workload, and rework, and how an optimal overlapping strategy is deter-
mined. On the other hand, determining the right organizational structure is critical. We
allow organizational structure to be varied along departmentalization and assignment, and
process structure to be changed along dimensions of exploration and exploitation. In this
model framework, we investigate the manner in which organizational model exhibits the
property of stability in response to process variation when prefect alignment is retained.
We next turn to question the important role of organizational structure in decision-making.
The attributes considered in this line of study include the decision process, i.e., hierarchy
and polyarchy, information structure, or team specialties, and two types of communication
structures. We show how the comparative performance of each combination of these at-
tribute can be impacted with one another, furthering the design of organizational structure.
In addition to these highlights, a set of important managerial implications drawn from these
studies are summarized as main contributions of this thesis.
5.2 Contributions
Managers face overlapped NPD processes usually consider lead time, rework, and to-
tal workload as key performance measures. However, each measure is most likely to be
contingent on the overlapping strategy adapted. Clearly, comparing among a set of strate-
gies, sequential engineering would yield the least workload and rework while entailing the
longest lead time. Ordinary overlap and functional interaction with duplication are two
strategies most potential for achieving shortest lead time. However, the former faces the
inevitable risk of rework whereas the latter may, most likely, entail huge amount of work-
load. On the other hand, functional interaction with starvation performs well in terms of
reducing the total workload. The drawback is its relatively longer lead time. In short, the
strategies have demonstrated diverse effectiveness in terms of lead time, rework, and total
workload, thus selection of an appropriate strategy for organizing sequentially dependent
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NPD processes is subject to the measure which managers value the most.
While organizational process changes, managers who respond by altering the organiza-
tional model and assignment should evaluate the need for restructuring. In short term and
moderate process improvement along exploration and/or exploitation dimension, fitness in
terms of alignment may be retained as organizational structures are stable in this dynamic
environment. Since the level of tolerance is convex to the opportunity loss, a low tolerance
level is preferable when long term radical and continuous process improvement occurs.
This strategy uses low tolerance to retain organizational structure stable while entailing a
net cost of restructuring, which is usually high, with the relatively lower opportunity loss.
The study also implies that restructuring is necessary at the completion of process im-
provement. Otherwise, opportunity loss cumulates as time elapses which would ultimately
render the organization less competitive.
Finally, managing organizations by decision structures becomes complicated when team
specialty is introduced as a variable in a project screening environment where each project
is characterized by two factors. On the one hand, our analysis on a group of organiza-
tions has shown that the relative merit of hierarchy and polyarchy is not only dependent
on the environment, but on the specialty of agents as well as the organizational preference
over the two factors. Only the knowledge that agents possess is equally balanced over the
two factors can the decision structures be solely compared with respect to the environment.
Otherwise, there is less clear-cut difference between hierarchy and polyarchy. For example,
hierarchy may still be better than polyarchy in “good” environment of the one factor when
the team knowledge on this factor is less than the other. On the other hand, determining
the right team composition is also important. The results imply that when an organization
prefers one factor more than another, and the corresponding environment to that factor is
bad, increasing the team specialty on the other factor is not preferable to the increase of
total utility. Attention should be paid to the net effect of over and underestimation, which
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are inevitable during everyday decision-making, on the overall decision process. Lastly, the
comparison between the two types of communication structures yields the conclusion that
sharing between two agents the decision results is always preferable when the environment
is uncertain as opposed to independent decision making. The communication structure
should be so designed as to make the agents aware of the previous decisions. But note that
this implication is based on the assumption that agents tend to follow the historical deci-
sions on the same event. That is, if the project is previously accepted, she is more likely to
accept it, and vice versa.
5.3 Future Research
The possible extensions of this thesis have been separately discussed in each chapter. A
set of key future development is concluded here. First of all, in addition to the case study
summarized in Appendix B which is based on the processes of an instrument company, we
shall apply the process model to a different industry. More investigation is needed to under-
stand how design strategies affect the NPD performance when the design specification and
the process evolution are changed. On the other hand, coupled activities are common in
NPD. Different from sequential engineering, its interdependent nature forces simultaneous
development. Uncertain information becomes inevitable for both up and downstream pro-
cesses. Overlapping strategies not only affect downstream process, but impact the progress
of upstream. We shall extend our model to address this effect for coupled-activities and
ultimately study the comparative performance under different strategies. Secondly, much
emphasis on the design of organizational structure studied in Chapter 3 is through the in-
vestigation in a dynamic space where processes change incrementally and/or radically. As
stated earlier, it is of practical interest to further understand the behaviour of organizational
structure when processes evolve through an approach other than direct exploration and ex-
ploitation. For example, processes can change locally and globally with respect to agents,
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and discretely and continuously with respect to time. Hence, the process variation space
immediately extends with the inclusion of these two important factors, suggesting a direc-
tion of future study that we shall follow. Lastly, as a study on the classical problem in
decision structure, we shall further extend the work present in Chapter 4 by applying the
model to more general, but practically sound, decision structures, such as committee with
more than two agents. We shall question to what extent the implications drawn from our
simplified model hold in a more general setting. In particular, we would like to move the
thesis forward to study the manner in which a continuous evaluation operation, instead of
dichotomous decisions, impacts the decision-making behaviour, and consequently affects
the performance of the organization.
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Appendix A
This contains additional information about Chapter 2.
[Dingyu Zhang, and Nadia Bhuiyan. “Designing Snake Robotic Endoscope by Over-
lapping Processes.” Proceedings of the 2016 Industrial and Systems Engineering Research
Conference]
We have investigated the comparative performance of different overlapping strategies
for the development of a snake robotic endoscope. By using the model concerning infor-
mation exchange and evolution, we evaluate the magnitude of rework, lead-time, and total
workload based on the dependence of up-stream process, i.e., actuator power, and down-
stream process, i.e., nominal dimension. The results show that when the up-stream evolves
slowly whereas down-stream quickly, ordinary overlapping has moderate performance, and
function interaction with duplication is the best strategy in reducing lead-time.
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qijE(αj|ξi) = E(µi|ξi) i = 1, ..., n. (B.0.1)
It can be solved by introducing new co-ordinates b1, ..., bn, and by Marschak & Radner
(1972)
αi = biξi i = 1, ..., n. (B.0.2)








Equation (B.0.1) also gives the relationship between the best decision function under the














qijrij i = 1, ..., n. (B.0.6)
Under identical interaction, that is qii = 1, qij = q, we have bi = 1 for all i. As a result, the
best decision rule under information ξ is αˆ = ξ. That is, every team member follows the
instruction. By Equation (3.3.4), the value for η1 is







2 + d(n− 1)qr). (B.0.7)
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Appendix C
Initial process R12 is generated by structuring a sequential process whose dependences
are uniformly distributed random numbers (U(0, 1)), see the tabulated representation sum-
marized in Figure C.1, R12. Each new process of higher complexity is generated by adding
one random bilateral link over its neighbour process. For example, R14 is generated by
adding a dependent link between units two and seven, the degrees of dependence are ran-
dom numbers, i.e., r27 = 0.45, r72 = 0.61. This procedure continues until the most com-
plex process (R42) is generated, see Figure C.1, R42. We adopt a convention that a process
Rn is generated by adding dependences based on Rn−2. All intermediate complexities are
shown in table C.1.
Table C.1: Process dependence structures
R14 r27=0.45 r72=0.61 R16 r47=0.38 r74=0.75 R18 r37=0.13 r73=0.91
R20 r46=0.10 r64=0.63 R22 r57=0.96 r75=0.16 R24 r17=0.96 r71=0.34
R26 r25=0.22 r52=0.75 R28 r15=0.51 r51=0.70 R30 r35=0.91 r53=0.13
R32 r36=0.63 r63=0.10 R34 r14=0.55 r41=0.96 R36 r26=0.16 r62=0.97
R38 r24=0.49 r42=0.80 R40 r13=0.42 r31=0.92 R42 r16=0.79 r61=0.96
126
Figure C.1: Process dependence structures R12 and R42
127
Appendix D
Proof of proposition 4.5.3.









= 2Aw2r(Bwr + C + 2), (D.0.9)
where A = α(1− α), B = −2ϵr − 2α+2β +2ϵrα+2ϵrβ, and C = ϵr − 2β − 2ϵrβ. Due
to symmetry, replacing (ϵr, α, β, wr) with (ϵt, β, α, wt) gives sH2 and s
P
2 .
Let us consider sH1 as a function of wr, which is 1−wt. We have sH1 |wr=1 = 2A(2α(1−
ϵr) + ϵr) ≥ 0 and sH1 |wr= 12 =
1
2
A(α(1− ϵr) + β(1 + ϵr)) ≥ 0. Besides, sH1 = 0 has three
roots, among which wr = 0 is a repeated root of order two, another root is wr = −CB .
Observe that B = −C − ϵr − 2α(1− ϵr) ≤ −C. Let w′ := −CB , a simple analysis shows,
C < 0 C ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ wr ≤ w′ C ≥ 0 and w′ ≤ wr ≤ 1
sH1 ≥ 0 ≤ 0 ≥ 0
Note that the condition C ≥ 0 is equivalent to β ≤ 1
4
and ϵr ≥ 2β1−2β , and it is not hard
to see that in this case 0 ≤ w′ ≤ 1
2








≤ wr < 1, 0 < β < 1, then
(sH1 − sH2 )|α=1 = β(1− β)(1− wr)2(ϵt(4β − 4βwr − 2)− 4β − 4wr + 4βwr) < 0.
By continuity of sH1 − sH2 with respect to α, we know sH1 − sH2 < 0 when α is close but not
equal to 1. Similar calculation gives the following table which is equivalent to part A (4).
1
2
≤ wr < 1 12 ≤ wt < 1
α = 1, 0 < β < 1 β = 0, 0 < α < 1 α = 0, 0 < β < 1 β = 1, 0 < α < 1
sH1 − sH2 < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0
α = 0, 0 < β < 1 β = 1, 0 < α < 1 α = 1, 0 < β < 1 β = 0, 0 < α < 1
sP1 − sP2 < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0









ϵr) ≤ 0. And by noting ∂U2∂α = 0 at α = {0, 1}, s3 is conserved over α. Consider extreme
environment in hierarchy, we have
sH3 |α=0 = −w2r(wr(−4ϵr + 4β + 4ϵrβ) + 2ϵr − 4β − 4ϵrβ), (D.0.10)
sH3 |α=1 = w2r(wr(−4 + 4β + 4ϵrβ) + 2ϵr − 4β − 4ϵrβ). (D.0.11)
For general and research oriented university, we have sH3 |α=0,wr= 12 =
β
2
(ϵr + 1) ≥ 0,
sH3 |α=0,wr=1 = 2ϵr ≥ 0, sH3 |α=1,wr= 12 =
1
2
(ϵr − 1 − β(ϵr + 1)) ≤ 0, and sH3 |α=1,wr=1 =
2ϵr−4 < 0. Again, since s3 = 0 has three roots, among which wr = 0 is a repeated root of
order two, we can derive from these conditions that sH3 |α=0,wr≥ 12 ≥ 0, and s
H
3 |α=1,wr≥ 12 ≤ 0.
Applying the same logic for polyarchy, we have
sP3 |α=0 = w2r(wr(−4ϵr + 4β + 4ϵrβ) + 2ϵr − 4β − 4ϵrβ + 4), (D.0.12)
sP3 |α=1 = −w2r(wr(−4 + 4β + 4ϵrβ) + 2ϵr − 4β − 4ϵrβ + 4). (D.0.13)
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And for polyarchy, we have sP3 |α=0,wr= 12 =
1
2
(2−β−ϵrβ) ≥ 0, sP3 |α=0,wr=1 = 4−2ϵr > 0,
sP3 |α=1,wr= 12 = −
1
2
(2ϵr + 1 − β − ϵrβ) ≤ 0, and sP3 |α=1,wr=1 = −2ϵr ≤ 0. As a result,
sP3 |α=0,wr≥ 12 ≥ 0, and s
P
3 |α=1,wr≥ 12 ≤ 0. Finally, if wr ≥ (≤)
1
2
, then s3|α=0 ≥ 0, s3|α=1 ≤ 0
as desired. Proof regarding s4 is symmetric.
Part C. The results follow immediately by noting
sH5 = −sP5 = 4σ2β(ϵt + 1)wr(wr − 1)2, (D.0.14)
where σ2β is the variance of information β. Again, s6 is symmetric, thus omitted.
Part D. Note that s5 is independent of α, positive in hierarchy, and negative in polyarchy.
Furthermore, s3 is non-negative in bad research environment and non-positive in good.
Hence, in order to prove part D, it is sufficient to consider the sign of s3 − s5 at α = 0 in
hierarchy, and α = 1 in polyarchy. Let us consider hierarchy first. If argminwr sH3 |α=0 = 1,
then




On the other hand, if argminwr sH3 |α=0 = 12 , then
(sH3 − sH5 )|α=0 ≥
β
2
(ϵr − ϵt + β(ϵt + 1)). (D.0.16)
Now consider polyarchy, if argmaxwr sP3 |α=1 = 0.5, then




On the other hand, if argmaxwr sP3 |α=1 = 1, then
(sP3 − sP5 )|α=1 ≤
1
8
(ϵt + 1) + 2ϵr. (D.0.18)
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Let (D.0.15) and (D.0.16) be positive, (D.0.17) and (D.0.18) be negative, we have (sH3 −
sH5 )|α=1 ≥ 0 and (sP3 − sP5 )|α=1 ≤ 0 if ϵr ≥ ϵt. The symmetric case regarding teaching is
omitted.
Proof of proposition 4.6.1.








= 4a(1− ϵ)β2 + (−1− 4a+ 4ϵa)β + a+ 0.5, (D.0.20)
which are convex in β, s|β=0 < 0, and s|β=1 > 0 in hierarchy, and s|β=0 > 0, and s|β=1 < 0
in polyarchy. It follows immediately that s = 0 has one solution β = c in hierarchy, and
β = 1 − c in polyarchy, refer to equation (4.6.2). Hence, we have, in hierarchy, s ≤ 0 if
and only if β ≤ c, and in polyarchy, s ≤ 0 if and only if β ≥ 1 − c. On the other hand, a
pure research university has exactly the same results with β replaced by α.









which are convex in α and β, and s|α=0 ≤ 0, s|α=1 ≥ 0 in hierarchy, and s|α=0 ≥ 0,
s|α=1 ≤ 0 in polyarchy. Again, the solution to s = 0 is
β = cH =
4a− 2ϵa− 4αa− 1 + 2A
4a(1− ϵ)) , (D.0.23)
β = cP =
4a− 2ϵa− 4αa+ 1− 2B
4a(1− ϵ)) , (D.0.24)
where A =
√−4ϵ2α2a2 + 4ϵ2αa2 + ϵ2a2 + 8ϵα2a2 − 8ϵαa2 + 2ϵαa− ϵa+ 0.25,
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B =
√−4ϵ2α2a2 + 4ϵ2αa2 + ϵ2a2 + 8ϵα2a2 − 8ϵαa2 − 2ϵαa+ ϵa+ 0.25. Finally, in hi-
erarchy, s ≤ 0 if and only if β ≤ cH , and in polyarchy, s ≤ 0 if and only if β ≥ cP , as
desired.




≤ 0, and ∂cP
∂ϵ
≤ 0.
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